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THE NATURE OF DEFENSES USED BY SCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN WITH ADHD  
by 
Laurie G. Slodounik 
Advisor: Steven B. Tuber, PhD. 
This study sought to develop a more nuanced clinical picture of children with ADHD by 
examining the relationship between their emotional dysregulation and their use of defense 
mechanisms—the unconscious mental processes that guard against strong emotions. Children’s 
responses to the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) were examined for evidence of defense 
mechanisms using an empirically validated scale, the Defense Mechanism Manual. The study 
employed a mixed between-within nonequivalent group design to examine the responses of 37 
children ages 7-10. It was hypothesized that children with ADHD would use more frequent and 
more immature defenses than their peers without the disorder. Additionally, those TAT cards 
designated as “high arousal” were predicted to elicit more defense mechanisms than those 
considered to be less emotionally stimulating. Results indicated that ADHD was not a significant 
predictor of defense use. However, arousal level and age were found to be significant predictors 
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 “Can you come take a look at Charlie1?”  His teachers ask. “He is so smart and 
thoughtful, but at times he seems totally checked out, and at others he’s out-of-control silly and 
provocative. He can also be so impulsively aggressive – he’ll be playing one minute and 
punching the next.” I spend a day at Charlie’s preschool watching him play. He is often on the 
periphery of the group – playing by himself or staring off into the distance. During singing time 
he fidgets on the rug, leans on his neighbor, and does not sing, despite his obvious musicality as 
we later walk down the hallway from the classroom to the big room. Once there, Charlie 
repeatedly collides with the other children – grabbing away balls and bikes, chasing and tackling, 
pushing and hitting – before climbing into a thick foam tunnel and staying there for several 
minutes in silent contemplation. When a friend comes by to ask if he can climb in and join him, 
Charlie yells “No!” and then dissolves into tears. Indeed, as the school day progresses, I see 
multiple outbursts of joy, anger, and sadness, often in quick succession. There is a rawness to 
Charlie – it is as though he is lacking a needed stimulus barrier; as though his nerves are exposed 
such that he can’t help but feel everything. At the end of the day I tell his teachers that Charlie is 
a sensitive soul; he feels both positive and negative things deeply. I explain that this is a strength 
because it means he is capable of intense passion and creativity, but it is also something Charlie 
will need help managing, if he is to succeed socially and academically. 
 What makes the souls of some children more sensitive than those of others? And how can 






enough so that they can enjoy themselves without being frequently flooded with strong emotion?  
Children like Charlie, who meet the diagnostic criteria for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD), are characterized by impairments in physical and emotional self-regulation 
that often impede their social and academic functioning, disrupt their family life, and damage 
their sense of self-worth. With the medicalization of the mental health field in recent decades, 
and the accordant rise in the prescription of stimulant medication as the primary treatment for 
children with ADHD, a neurobiological/neurocognitive understanding of the disorder has been 
privileged over a psychodynamic-developmental one (Leuzinger-Bohleber, Canestri, & Target, 
2010; Gnaulati, 2008). This study, however, employed a psychodynamic framework in an 
attempt to expand our understanding of the intrapsychic dimensions of ADHD and develop a 
more nuanced clinical picture of children with the disorder.  
 This chapter will begin with a discussion of the normative development of emotions and 
the related development of neurophysiological, social, and mental mechanisms (both conscious 
and unconscious) that we employ to contain and regulate them. This will be followed by a 
discussion of a subset of children for whom these developmental processes seem to have gone 
awry – namely, children with ADHD. Finally, the use of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) 
to evaluate emotion regulation in children – and the particular utility of this measure in assessing 
the defense mechanism use of children with ADHD – will be explained.  
Emotional Development  
Definition of Emotion, Feeling, and Affect 
 The words “emotion,” “feeling” and “affect” are often used interchangeably. However, 
more specific definitions of the latter two terms delineate “feeling” as the subjective experience 
of emotion and “affect” as its expressive (i.e. facial and postural) components (Plutchik, 2000; 
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Damasio, 2000; Sroufe, 1995). Still, this leaves the precise definition of the term “emotion” 
unclear – mirroring a lack of consensus in the literature. Whereas early research made much of 
the distinction between emotions as static states and emotion regulation as a dynamic process, 
current research suggests that both the expression and regulation of emotions are dynamic 
processes, which are intertwined and reciprocal from birth (Scherer, 2009; Campos, Frankel, & 
Camras, 2004; Hoeksma, Oosterlaan, & Schipper, 2004). Broadly, emotions can be considered 
complex and dynamic psycho-physiological processes which “guide, direct, amplify, color, and 
shape action” (Sroufe, 1995, p. 17). Plutchik (2000) adds that emotions are “universal (in the 
sense of being part of the repertoire of all living things)” and “useful in the sense that they 
communicate possibilities of danger, threat, or pleasure and therefore influence the behavior of 
others” (p. 79, italics in the original). 
 Emotions emerge along a developmental timeline, in accord with advances in motor, 
linguistic, cognitive, and social development. According to Sroufe (1995), the “emergence of the 
affects is largely a normative issue… Emotional regulation, on the other hand, is often an arena 
for the study of individual differences” (p. 8). According to Thompson (2011), such individual 
differences may be due to the influence of early relational and environmental (including in-utero) 
experiences (particularly adverse or stressful ones) which can interact with a child’s 
neurobiological development and innate temperament, to alter her “threshold for reactivity” – or 
in the words of the introduction, make her “soul more sensitive” to affective stimulation (p. 55). 
The specific deficits in emotion regulation observed in children with ADHD will be discussed 





Developmental Model of Emotion 
 Tuber (2012) lays out a developmental progression of affective awareness and 
understanding. Initially, the infant experiences affects as distinct “events” which come and go, 
leaving no enduring trace; the intense discomfort and anguished cries of a hungry baby are 
extinguished as soon as nourishment arrives. As the infant’s cognitive and memory capacities 
expand, the experience of emotion becomes less fleeting and less external. By toddlerhood, the 
young child can recognize facial expressions as reflective of simple affects, but seems to equate 
facial expression and emotion in a one-to-one, objective way (i.e. a smiling face is happiness). At 
this stage, the toddler still has little sense of affects as complex (i.e. often mixed) subjective 
experiences. During the preschool years, the child’s capacity to experience mixed emotions 
expands, but her egocentricity limits her ability to recognize that her affective experience may 
differ from that of others, and that others’ affects can be a result of their own subjective 
experiences/associations. The school-aged child is capable of understanding affects as 
“psychological states of mind” that can be mixed, subjective, and interrelated (Tuber, 2012, p. 
32). However, latency-aged children often equate affect with role (i.e. the malevolent school 
principal). Indeed, it is typically not until late adolescence that an individual is fully capable of 
experiencing and understanding affects as fully flexible and complex. 
 Along with these advances in affective awareness and understanding come concordant 
developments in the variety of emotions available to the individual. According to Sroufe (1995), 
the newborn begins life with physiology-based “pre-emotional reactions” which are the 
“prototypes” for the “precursor emotions” that emerge in the first half of the first year and 
ultimately become the three “major emotions” of anger, fear, and joy, which underlie all other 
more complex emotions (p. 57). Developmental and psychodynamic theorists such as Sroufe 
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(1995), Stern (2000), and Winnicott (1963), point out that it is only when the infant develops a 
sense of self as separate from the caregiver (around 5 months) that she can begin to experience 
emotions in earnest. Before this time, infants can communicate distress (a prototype of the 
negative emotions of fear and anger) and “turn toward” (a prototype of the positive emotion of 
joy).   
 According to Sroufe (1995), over the course of the first 5 months or so, the infant’s 
generalized distress in response to any kind of discomfort (as evidenced by crying, flailing, etc.) 
develops into the precursor emotions of wariness and frustration. Wariness – crying in response 
to “the unavoidable/unassimilable” – is an emotional reaction because it occurs in reaction to a 
specific type of event (the novel or unknown) (p. 62). Ultimately, wariness will develop into the 
capacity for the basic emotion of fear. Frustration – screaming/crying in response to the inability 
to “execute an established motor pattern” – ultimately develops into the capacity for anger; a 
more immediate negative reaction to thwarted effort (whether the task has or has not been 
accomplished before) (p. 63). Finally, the early, automatic, purely physiological sleep smiles of 
newborns develop into the precursor emotion of pleasure, as evidenced by voluntary smiling in 
response to specific stimuli (i.e. a face or mobile). Ultimately this capacity to experience 
pleasure develops into the capacity to feel joy.  
 The self-conscious emotions of embarrassment, pride, guilt, and shame do not emerge 
until late toddlerhood/early preschool years, as the child’s sense of self, motor, linguistic, and 
cognitive capacities, and sense of societal expectations, all expand (Schore, 2003). Table 1 





Table 1. Milestones of Early Emotional Development 








Neonatal/sleep smile  
 
6/7 wks:  Social smile 
emerges  
2 mos: smile at events 
they can control 
 
3-4 mos: smile and laugh 
7 mos: selective smiles 
for familiar people 
                   




Generalized distress due 
to hunger, pain, 
overstimulation 
2 mos: facial expressions 
of anger and sadness 
 
4 mos: wary of 
unfamiliar objects and 
events 
6/7 mos: stranger anxiety 
emerges 
 
8 mos: separation anxiety 
emerges 
                                                               à            Wariness        à       Fear 
                  Prototype of negative affect 
                                                               à         Frustration       à       Anger 
  
Emotion Regulation  
 Emotion expression and regulation is a complex, dynamic process, involving bodily 
systems, brain circuits, and social interactions, as well as conscious and unconscious mental 
processes – all of which interact with and influence one another in different ways over the course 
of development (Sroufe, 1995; Thompson, 2011; Plutchik, 2000; Hoeksma et al., 2004). 
According to Eisenberg and Spinrad (2004), emotion regulation is: 
 The process of initiating, avoiding, inhibiting, maintaining, or modulating the occurrence, 
form, intensity, or duration of internal feeling states, emotion-related physiological, 
attentional processes, motivational states, and/or the behavioral concomitants of emotion 
in the service of accomplishing affect-related biological or social adaptation or achieving 




Social Aspects of Emotion Regulation 
 The process of emotion regulation begins as a dyadic one embedded in the infant-
caregiver relationship. Initially, the newborn is wholly dependent on her caregivers for soothing; 
her only recourse otherwise is to retreat into sleep. However, by the age of six months, the 
infant’s increasing ability to control her attention and movement enables her to begin to regulate 
herself by averting her gaze, rubbing or stroking her body or a soft toy, or distracting herself 
when overstimulated or distressed. As her language skills expand over the course of the first 
three years, the child becomes increasingly able to self-regulate through a mix of self-talk and 
talk with caregivers (to whom she can express her worries, desires and needs, and from whom 
she can obtain verbal reassurance and comfort) (Sroufe, 1995; Schore, 2003; Gnaulati, 2008). 
 It is through interactions with her caregivers that the child gradually builds an 
understanding and expectation of how relationships work (i.e. how quickly and in what ways 
others will respond to her). These “internal working models” of relationships in turn, influence 
the ways she will behave in future social interactions, and also shape her burgeoning sense of 
self (Bowlby, 1988; Wallin, 2007). Early experiences of attuned, responsive and contingent 
interactions with caregivers foster in the child a sense of herself as an agentic, social being, and a 
sense of her caregivers as reliable, trustworthy, and regulating (Stern, 1985). However, when 
infant-parent dyads are not well-attuned, the infant is more likely to experience herself as 
ineffectual and dysregulated and to experience the world as unresponsive and disorganizing 
(Tronick, 1989).  
Neurophysiological Aspects of Emotion Regulation 
 The body and brain work in concert to regulate arousal and affect through a series of 
“nested feedback loops” (Thompson et al., 2008). These positive and negative feedback loops 
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“create emotional circuits that allow for continuous changes of the state of the [emotional] 
system” (Hoeksma, et al., 2004, p. 354). Bodily systems involved in the expression, experience, 
and regulation of emotion include the parasympathetic nervous system, which influences heart 
rate and stress reactions (Thompson et al., 2008). Neurological systems involved in the 
emotional system include complex circuits connecting the diencephalon (thalamus and 
hypothalamus), limbic system (hippocampal formation, amygdala), cerebral cortex (including the 
cingulated and prefrontal cortices) and brain stem, as well as neuromodulators such as 
acetylcholine, serotonin and dopamine (Thompson et al., 2008; Hoeksma et al., 2004).  
 Innate temperamental differences also play a role in how an individual experiences and 
regulates emotion. Chess and Thomas (1996) identify three temperamental archetypes that 
biologically predispose children to react to stimulation in characteristic ways. An “easy” infant 
exhibits a generally positive mood, recovers quickly from moments of distress, adapts well to 
novel situations and people, and sleeps and eats regularly. A “difficult” infant exhibits more 
frequent and intense negative emotions, has a harder time recovering from moments of distress 
and tolerating novelty, and tends to be more dysregulated around eating and sleeping. Finally, 
“slow-to-warm” infants tend to withdraw and exhibit fear in response to novelty and need 
repeated exposures to stimuli in order to feel comfortable. A fourth temperamental type; that of 
“behavioral inhibition,” has been identified as a more extreme version of the “slow-to-warm” 
temperament. Behaviorally inhibited infants are characterized by an intense aversion to 
unfamiliar situations and stimuli, as demonstrated by heightened sympathetic arousal, leading to 
a “freeze defense” in which they become immobile (Gnaulati, 2008; Anstendig, 1999).   
 However, it is often the “goodness of fit” between a child’s temperament and that of her 
caregiver that is more important than her innate disposition per se. Babies whose parents find 
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them easy to soothe are likely to have more frequent positive, regulating experiences, and in turn 
develop a sense of themselves and their world as generally well-organized and predictable. 
Conversely, babies whose parents find them to be difficult to soothe are likely to have more 
frequent negative, uncomfortable and dysregulating interactions with their caregivers, and to 
ultimately develop a sense of themselves and their world as disorganized and overwhelming 
(Leuzinger-Bohleber, et al., 2010; Gnaulati, 2008). Moreover, according to Schore (2002), 
repeated early experiences of mis-attunement – particularly those fostering “chronic and 
cumulative states of overwhelming, hyperaroused affective states” or persistent states of 
“hypoaroused dissociation” in the infant – can actually impair the development of the brain, 
particularly that of the right hemisphere, which is integral in the perception, expression and 
regulation of emotion (p. 460).  
Intrapsychic Aspects of Emotion Regulation 
 Mental mechanisms are also involved in the process of emotion regulation – and 
conversely, emotions play a role in cognitive functioning. Most theories of the relation between 
cognition and emotion focus on the processes of appraisal and coping (Lazarus, 1991, as cited in 
Plutchik, 2000). Appraisal refers to the process by which individuals assess their environment, 
make judgments about their safety, and conduct cost-benefit analyses of possible courses of 
action. It can occur on both a conscious and unconscious (automatic) level. Coping occurs as a 
result of appraisal, and refers to the individual’s attempt to maintain his physical and 
psychological safety through physical actions (i.e. fighting or fleeing when threatened) or 
cognitive actions (i.e. reinterpreting the situation in order to minimize the threat), either of which 
can function to reduce affective stimulation. Affective stimulation can also influence cognitive 
functioning. Positive feelings such as happiness, confidence, and pride can spur curiosity, 
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learning and understanding, while negative feelings such as anger, sadness, and shame can be 
inhibiting and can lead to disorganized thinking and behaving (Schore, 2003; Gnaulati, 2008).  
 It is because our emotions can have such an influence on our sense of self and our sense 
of the world (and vice versa) that we make such efforts to dampen or control them. Indeed, in 
addition to their biological functions of “promoting and maintaining life,” emotion regulatory 
processes also function to “maintain psychological integrity” through unconscious mental 
mechanisms that serve to protect the ego from unpleasant feelings (Hoeksma et al., 2004, p. 
355). Moreover, emotions themselves can “become part of our defensive system” in that they can 
“act to protect the self” (Vaillant, 1997 as cited in Plutchik, 2000, p. 55). We will now explore 
the concept of ego defense mechanisms in depth, as they will be central to our attempt to 
understand the emotional dysregulation of children with ADHD.  
Defense Mechanisms 
 Defense mechanisms are unconscious mental processes that serve to protect individuals 
from unpleasant or unwanted feelings and thereby enable them to maintain a sense of self-esteem 
and self-coherence (Cramer, 2006). The understanding of defense has evolved over time from 
Freud’s (1894/1957) initial conception of defense as a purely intrapsychic process employed to 
maintain internal equilibrium, to the current conception of defense as “a set of relational and 
cognitive patterns” that develop within an interpersonal context in an attempt to adapt to 
“conflict, loss, and trauma” (Cooper, 1998, p. 947).  
Historical Definition 
 Freud originally conceived of defense as the ego’s attempt to keep unacceptable impulses 
and ideas (deriving from the drives) out of conscious awareness via the process of repression 
(Leichsenring, 2004). In this way, the ego could engage in the “splitting of consciousness” that 
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enabled hysterical patients to separate an “incompatible” or intolerable idea from its associated 
affect (Freud, 1894/1957, p. 51). Later, when his focus turned from drive theory to a theory of 
signal anxiety, Freud (1926/1959) expanded the concept of defense to include “all the techniques 
which the ego makes use of in conflicts which may lead to a neurosis,” and went on to designate 
several defense mechanisms in addition to repression, including: regression, undoing (reversal), 
reaction formation, isolation, and anticathexis (pp. 89-90). At this point, defense mechanisms 
came to be understood as “processes functioning within the ego to maintain the unconscious 
status of forbidden impulses,” and thereby protect the ego from being overwhelmed by an excess 
of anxiety (Cooper, 1998, p. 951). 
The Evolution of the Concept 
 Anna Freud (1936/1966) further expanded her father’s concept of defense mechanisms, 
adding introjection/identification, projection, turning against the self, and sublimation to the list 
of defenses, and proposing that they may arise in reaction to external sources of anxiety as well 
as to internal stressors. She viewed defense use as a normal and potentially adaptive cognitive 
process in that it allows individuals to function in anxiety-provoking situations, and argued that it 
is only when defenses are used rigidly or excessively that they may become pathological 
(Leichsenring, 2004; Laor, Wolmer, & Cicchetti, 2001; Cramer, 1987). Ego psychologists such 
as Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein (1964) added to this concept of defenses as adaptive, 
describing defense mechanisms as among a variety of functions employed by the ego in its 
attempts to cope with external and internal (i.e. drive) demands in order to maintain internal 
homeostasis. Schafer (1968) added further complexity to the understanding of defenses by 
articulating their dual nature; defenses prevent the conscious experiencing of intolerable 
emotions, while still allowing their expression and therefore, their gratification. This “double 
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agent” quality of defense can be seen in the “killing with kindness” aspect of reaction formation 
– which enables an individual to consciously express love toward another while still gratifying 
her unconscious hatred or aggression toward that person (Cooper, 1998). 
 Winnicott (1960/1965) added yet another layer to the concept of defense by 
distinguishing between those defenses that arise in response to intolerable internal impulses and 
those that arise in response to empathic failures in the relational environment. According to 
Winnicott, failure of the caregiver to be “good enough” (i.e. rejecting, nonresponsive, mis-
attuned, intolerant of certain affective expressions) may result in the formation of a “false self” in 
the child. This false self enables the child to defend against recognition of her caregiver’s 
failures, and in so doing, prevents her from feeling the disappointment, fear, and rage these 
failures likely engender. Thus, the function of the defense is twofold; it protects both the child 
and the caregiver from experiencing the child’s negative feelings toward the caregiver. In this 
way, the child is able maintain this vital connection, though at the cost of sacrificing her true self.  
Winnicott, therefore, began the expansion of the concept of defense beyond one of solely 
an ego function and into an understanding of defense as being also a response to interpersonal 
ruptures. Kohut (1977) added to this relational conception of defense by emphasizing the role of 
defense mechanisms in protecting the self (i.e. identity and self-esteem) from narcissistic injuries 
arising in response to empathic failures in childhood. The current understanding of defense 
mechanisms combines the early concept of anxiety-modulating ego function with the more 
recent relational understanding. According to Cramer (2006), 
 Defenses are unconscious mental mechanisms that are directed against both internal drive 
pressures and external pressures, especially those that threaten self-esteem or the 
structure of the self, as might occur when friends or family fail to be empathic or in some 
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other way are “lost” to the individual. The function of the defense mechanism is twofold: 
to protect the individual from experiencing excessive anxiety, and to protect the 
integration of the self. (p. 7) 
I would add that in this way, defenses influence and maintain interpersonal interactions and 
relationships.  
Developmental Model of Defense 
 Though Anna Freud described ten defense mechanisms, subsequent theorists have added 
to her list. The fourth Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) lists 31 defense mechanisms, in order of their level of adaptivity. 
This hierarchical presentation reflects a commonly held understanding of defense mechanisms as 
ranging in adaptivity or maturity level from maladaptive/primitive defenses such as denial and 
projection to more adaptive/mature defenses such as identification and sublimation (Porcerelli, 
Thomas, Hibbard, & Cogan, 1998; Leichsenring, 2004). Indeed, Vaillant, Bond, and Vaillant 
(1986) created an empirically validated hierarchy of defense based on a longitudinal study of 
men which correlated childhood ratings of family, environment, competence, emotional 
maturity, hyperactivity, parental social class, and IQ with ratings of health, social competence, 
psychosocial maturity, and maturity of defense use in adulthood. The resulting hierarchy of 
defense ranges from immature (regression, hypochondriasis, acting out, denial, projection, 
schizoid fantasy), to intermediate (isolation, repression, reaction formation, displacement), to 
mature (anticipation, suppression, altruism, sublimation, humor). Vaillant et al. (1986), found 
that “maturity of defenses correlated with mental health most strongly when the individual had 
experienced a bleak childhood,” suggesting that maturity of defense use is a predictor of 
psychological adjustment independent of familial and environmental factors (p. 791). 
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 Defense mechanisms vs. coping mechanisms. 
The seemingly ever-increasing list of defense mechanisms reflects longstanding and 
widespread confusion about the unconscious nature of defense – as reflected in the fact that some 
of the “mature” defenses listed above seem likely to be consciously generated (Tuber, 2012; 
Vaillant, 1998). Cramer (2006) suggests that defensive cognitive processes that operate 
unconsciously should be considered true defenses, while conscious defensive strategies are better 
termed “coping mechanisms”. Tuber (2012) expands this idea by suggesting that defensive 
operations fall on a “continuum of consciousness” that is both “fluid and dynamic,” such that “a 
coping strategy can over time become more defensive and unconscious in nature… while a 
defensive stance can translate into a coping mechanism with insight” (p. 38).    
Cramer’s model of defense development. 
 Cramer (1987, 1990, 2006) has provided empirical evidence for a developmental model 
of defense mechanisms in which the defenses emerge in order of maturity from primitive to 
complex over the lifespan, “much in the same way that other ego functions (e.g. cognitive 
operations or moral reasoning) emerge in a developmental, stage-related fashion” (Cramer, 1987, 
p. 598). Thus, a young child’s use of denial is considered age-appropriate, but a young-adult’s 
use of denial is considered immature. Inherent in this model is the understanding that “every 
defense co-exists with every other defense but… certain defenses take on greater importance at 
certain developmental periods through a combination of ego development and environmental 
experience” (Porcerelli et al., 1998, p. 412). Cramer’s model focuses on the developmental 
trajectories of three defenses: denial, projection, and identification. Each defense is thought to 
begin as a motor reflex and end as an intrapsychic mechanism.  
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 Denial protects the individual from accurately perceiving internal or external stressors by 
denying or misrepresenting their existence. It is a defense used most frequently by young 
children, and is therefore considered the most primitive defense. It begins in infancy as the 
impulse to close one’s eyes, look away, or withdraw into sleep in response to overstimulation or 
unpleasant stimulation. Toddlers may use their burgeoning language abilities to employ denial 
via negation (e.g. “no,” “I’m not afraid,” “that didn’t hurt”). By early childhood, denial becomes 
more internal; it takes the form of fantasies of power and control. Indeed, the superhero and 
princess play themes common amongst preschoolers can be interpreted as defensive attempts to 
“transform weakness into strength, fear into courage and failure into success” through the use of 
denial (Cramer, 1987, p. 599). Such fantasies may continue into adolescence and adulthood as 
daydreams or misperceptions, often of an idealized, overly-positive, or Pollyannaish, quality. 
Typically the use of denial wanes after age seven and largely ends by middle childhood.  
 Projection protects the individual from internal and external stressors by attributing 
unacceptable thoughts, feelings, and desires to people outside oneself. Though, like denial, 
projection has a physical precursor in infancy (i.e., the impulse to spit out unpalatable 
substances), it is a defense that does not become predominant until late childhood and early 
adolescence (Cramer, 1997, 2006). Projection is considered a more mature defense than denial 
because it requires more highly developed cognitive and emotional abilities. For a child to 
project, she must be able to differentiate between what is internal and what is external – between 
self and other. She must also be able to make judgments about what is right and wrong, 
pleasurable and painful, good and bad, and acceptable and unacceptable. These psychological 
abilities enable the child to retain as a part of herself (or her ego) the positive aspects of a 
thought, wish, or impulse, while unconsciously attributing the negative aspects of the thought, 
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wish, or impulse to someone else. Thus, whereas in denial an entire mental representation is 
disowned, in projection a representation is split into a positive segment, which is owned and a 
negative segment, which is disowned. This expulsion of negative thoughts and impulses often 
results in an experience of the external world and others in it as threatening and dangerous. 
 Identification is considered to be a more mature defense than denial or projection, though 
it too can be said to originate in infancy (as the impulse to incorporate mother’s milk). As the 
child grows older, this desire for the physical incorporation of the parent gives way to one for the 
introjection of the parent’s beliefs, standards, interests, and skills in order to feel “the same as the 
model” (Cramer, 2006, p. 96). By adolescence, the individual becomes capable of identification 
proper. According to Cramer (2006), identification functions to “attenuate” the “anxiety caused 
by the loss, or anticipated loss, of a significant other” by “recreating that other internally” 
through the alteration of some aspect of the ego (p. 95).  By unconsciously changing one’s 
personality, behavior, or motives in order to become like a significant other, the individual 
maintains a sense of security and self-esteem. Through identification, adolescents internalize 
their parents’ rules and principles and thereby maintain parental approval and control 
unacceptable impulses. Adolescents also seek out and identify with role models in addition to 
their parents, in an effort to achieve an individuated sense of identity.  
 Thus, whereas projection involves the externalization of unacceptable internal mental 
representations, identification involves the internalization of important external experiences. 
Like projection, identification requires the capacity to differentiate between self and other. 
However, identification is considered more cognitively complex than projection because it also 
“involves a differentiation and modification within the ego; new ego structures – including the 
superego and the ego ideal – develop as in integral part of the process of identification” (Cramer, 
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2006, p. 93). Cross-sectional and longitudinal studies suggest that by late adolescence, 
identification replaces projection as the predominant defense (Cramer, 1987, 1998; Porcerelli et 
al., 1998).    
 Development of defense and its relation to psychological health. 
 As discussed earlier, Cramer’s developmental model of defense use understands the 
defenses to emerge over the lifespan in response to increasing cognitive capacities to make 
certain defenses more salient for certain developmental periods. A period of heightened stress 
would likely inspire particularly strong use of the defense mechanisms available at that age in an 
attempt to protect the ego and maintain self-esteem. These defenses may then become engrained 
in the personality in such a way that they continue to be used beyond the time that they are 
usually given up, resulting in overuse of immature defenses as the child ages (Cramer, 2006). 
Prospective studies of the relation between early psychological difficulties and later development 
support this model. Cramer and Block (1998) found that preschoolers (ages 3-5) who were rated 
highly by their teachers on a measure of “psychological upset” (e.g. easily distressed, labile, 
impulsive, taciturn, withdrawn) were more likely to employ denial (the defense most available at 
ages 3-5) at age 23 than those who were rated to have “no upset” in preschool. In another study 
of slightly older children (ages 5-7), Cramer and Tracey (2005) found a correlation between 
personality disturbance at ages 5-7 and the use of denial and projection (the two defenses most 
available at ages 5-7) 25 years later. 
 Studies have also shown the use of age-appropriate defenses to be associated with 
psychological health and the use of immature defenses to be associated with poor health at that 
moment, and over the course of development. In a prospective study that followed individuals 
from adolescence (ages 15-18) into late middle age (age 62), Cramer (2008) found that when 
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adolescents, those subjects who employed high levels of the mature defense of identification 
were more likely to exhibit “planful competence” (a measure of social, emotional, and 
intellectual maturity) than their peers who employed the less mature defense of projection. 
Moreover, high use of identification in adolescence was found to be associated with relative 
stability of competence in adulthood, while low use of identification in adolescence was 
associated with more variability in adult competence. Similarly, adolescents who were found to 
frequently use the developmentally immature defense of denial were found more likely to exhibit 
“ego undercontrol” and associated externalizing behaviors, than their peers who used more age-
appropriate defenses (Cramer, 2009). In a related study, Evans and Seaman (2000) found that 
adolescents (ages 15-18) who employed more mature defenses were found to also exhibit more 
mature, complex, integrated, and positive self-conceptions than their peers who used immature 
defenses.   
Measuring Defense Mechanisms 
 The empirical measurement of defense use is tricky, since it is hard to expect people to 
accurately report on processes of which they are not consciously aware, and the assessment of 
another’s defense use is largely subjective (Cramer, 2006; Leichsenring, 2004; Vaillant, 1998). 
Traditionally, researchers have attempted to assess defense use via self-report and observer-
based measures, the majority of which have been designed for use with adult subjects. 
Questionnaires such as the Defense Style Questionnaire (DSQ; originally Bond et al., 1983, but 
subsequently revised by several authors), and the Defense Mechanism Inventory (DMI; Gleser & 
Ihilevich, 1969) ask participants to report on their behavior in stressful situations or their 
reactions to hypothetical conflictual situations. Their answers are then scored for the defenses 
implied by their responses. The validity of such measures is questionable, as it is conceivable 
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that the defenses in question may be in use during the assessment – impairing the subject’s 
ability to accurately report on her own defense use (Cramer, 2006; Vaillant, 1998; Davidson & 
MacGregor, 1998).   
Observer-based measures of defense use involve the presentation of an open-ended visual 
or verbal prompt, or a clinical interview. The participant’s responses are then coded for evidence 
of defense use. Several defense scoring methods exist for the Rorschach Inkblot Method, 
including the Lerner Defense Scales (Lerner & Lerner, 1980) and the Rorschach Defense Scales 
(Cooper, Perry, & Arnow, 1988). Similarly, several scales have been developed for scoring 
evidence of defense use in clinical interviews, such as Vaillant’s clinical vignette method 
(Vaillant, 1977), the Defense Mechanism Rating Scales (Perry, 1990), and the Defensive 
Functioning Scale (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Such observer-based measures are 
time and labor intensive in their training, administration, and coding, but demonstrate generally 
good reliability (Cramer, 2006; Perry & Ianni, 1998).  
 Few measures of defense use in children exist, and most are self-report or parent-report 
measures, such as the Response Evaluation Meaure-71-Youth Version (REM-Y-71; Araujo et 
al., 2006), the Comprehensive Assessment of Defense Style (CADS; Laor, Wolmer, & Cicchetti, 
2001), and the Ego-Defense Scale (EDS; Pfeffer et al., 1979). This study will employ the 
Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM; Cramer, 1990, 2006), an observer-report measure that 
codes defense use in children’s narratives. The most widely used measure of defense use in 
children, the DMM was originally developed for use with the Thematic Apperception Test 
(TAT), but can also be used to code material from clinical interviews. A more specific 




Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
The focus of this study will be on children with ADHD – children who seem to have 
particular trouble with the perception, expression, tolerance, and regulation of emotion. English 
pediatrician George Still (1902) first described the constellation of developmentally 
inappropriate impulsive, inattentive, and hyperactive symptoms that we now characterize as 
ADHD at the turn of the last century (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). However it was 
not until the 1970s that the disorder became a focus of psychiatric research (Gilmore, 2000). 
Since then, ADHD has been discussed widely in both the scientific and lay literature. Though 
some critics contend that ADHD is an invalid diagnosis that serves only to pathologize children 
at the severe end of the normal behavioral spectrum, the current scientific consensus is that 
ADHD is in fact a distinct syndrome with a neurobiological basis, and this is true despite the fact 
that several disorders are commonly found to be comorbid with it (Faraone, 2005; Adler, Barkley 
& Wilens, 2006).   
Epidemiology and Phenomenology 
 ADHD has been described as “the most common neurobehavioral disorder of childhood” 
(Adler et al., 2006, p. 1). Conservative estimates place the prevalence of ADHD at 3-7% of the 
child population (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Polanczyk, Silva de Lima, Horta, 
Biederman, & Rohde, 2007), however rates ranging from 7-21% have been reported in 
community samples (Adler et al., 2006; Faraone, 2005; Harris, Reynoso, Meehan, Ueng-
McHale, & Tuber, 2006). In the clinical child population, approximately 30-50% of referrals for 
treatment are considered to be ADHD related (Barkley, 2005; Gilmore, 2000).  
 Though the disorder is not often diagnosed until the elementary school years, parents of 
children later diagnosed with ADHD often notice symptoms of dysregulation in toddlerhood 
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(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Indeed, one of the diagnostic criteria for ADHD is 
that some of the child’s hyperactive-impulsive or inattentive symptoms must have been present 
before age seven (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In fact, research suggests that 
symptoms of ADHD may be observable as early as in infancy. Auerbach et al. (2005) found that 
infants at familial risk for developing ADHD showed significantly more state organization 
difficulties (i.e. problems with irritability, lability, and self-quieting) and neurodevelopmental 
immaturity than infants who were not at risk. Indeed, regulatory difficulties in infancy, 
particularly difficulty with negative affect, have been found to be predictive of behavioral 
difficulties, including hyperactivity and inattention, in early childhood (Degani, Porges, Sickal, 
& Greenspan, 1993; Wolke, Rizzo, & Woods, 2002). And children ultimately diagnosed with 
ADHD are more likely to be “characterized by extreme affective traits like negative 
emotionality” (Martel, 2009, p. 1042). Children characterized by this trait tend to experience 
frequent and intense negative emotions (i.e. anger, sadness, and worry), which impact their 
behavior (i.e. impaired social competence and increased externalizing behaviors) (Eisenberg et 
al., 2000).  
 Academic and social consequences of ADHD. 
 Children with ADHD exhibit persistent functional impairments in the academic and 
social realms, which can negatively impact professional achievement and family and peer 
relationships well into adulthood (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Meehan et al., 2008; 
Gilmore, 2000). Longitudinal studies of children diagnosed with ADHD suggest that up to 80% 
will continue to display symptoms into adolescence, and up to 65% will continue to display 




 At school, children with ADHD have been found to exhibit impaired productivity and 
accuracy in all academic areas. They also exhibit specific delays in reading, math, and spelling, 
typically placing one-half to one full standard deviation below their peers on tests of academic 
achievement (Adler et al., 2006; Biederman et al., 2004). In addition, many children with ADHD 
exhibit behavioral problems in the classroom related to their inattention, impulsivity, and 
hyperactivity. It is for all these reasons that children with ADHD are more likely than their non-
ADHD peers to receive special education and/or counseling services at school, fail a grade, and 
be suspended or expelled from school (Bauermeister et al., 2007; Biederman et al., 2004; 
Faraone et al., 1993).  
 The social consequences of ADHD are similarly far-reaching and well documented. 
Children with ADHD have been found to exhibit deficits in social cognition and social behavior. 
Research suggests that there is a positive illusory bias in the self-perceptions of boys with 
ADHD, which causes such children to misperceive the relative success of their performance in 
social interactions, and to attribute their social failures to external, uncontrollable factors rather 
than to their own mistakes (Hoza, et al., 2000). Children with ADHD also exhibit deficits in 
emotion recognition, perspective-taking and empathy (Braaten & Rosen, 2000). These cognitive 
deficits, in combination with the high rates of intrusive, disruptive, and aggressive behaviors, and 
deficient social communication skills exhibited by ADHD children, tend to result in high rates of 
peer rejection (Nixon, 2001; Da Fonesca, Seguier, Santos, Poinso, & Deruelle, 2009).   
 Comorbidity. 
 The negative prognosis for children with ADHD is frequently compounded by the 
existence of comorbid disorders. Learning disorders and speech and language problems are 
diagnosed in 25-70% of ADHD cases seen in clinics (Adler et al., 2006; Nixon, 2001). Many 
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children with ADHD also meet the criteria for internalizing disorders, with estimated rates of 
comorbidity ranging from 15-75% for mood disorders (particularly depressive disorders), and 
25-30% for anxiety disorders (Bauermeister et al., 2007; Biederman, Newcorn, & Sprich, 1991). 
Externalizing disorders are also common in children with ADHD. It has been estimated that 25-
50% of children with ADHD meet the criteria for conduct disorder (CD) and oppositional defiant 
disorder (ODD) (Bauermeister et al., 2007; Fisher et al., 2005; Biederman et al., 1991). Studies 
have found that rates of arrest and drug abuse are elevated in adolescents with ADHD and are 
further exacerbated if CD is also present (Faraone, 2005). Moreover, approximately 18-24% of 
children with a diagnosis of both ADHD and CD may go on to develop antisocial personality 
disorder in young adulthood (Fisher et al., 2005). 
Theories of Etiology 
  While past research has expanded our understanding of the epidemiology and 
phenomenology of ADHD, there is still much disagreement about the best way to understand the 
etiology of the disorder. Conceptions of the underlying causes of ADHD have evolved over time. 
Still (1902) originally emphasized impaired volitional inhibition and poor “moral control” over 
behavior, and attributed these to an underlying neurological disorder. Theories that identified 
nonspecific brain injury or brain dysfunction as the cause of ADHD persisted into the 1960’s, 
even as conceptions of the disorder changed to focus primarily on hyperactivity (Gilmore, 2000; 
Barkley 1997a). These theories gave way in the 1970’s to a new emphasis on poor sustained 
attention and impaired impulse control, which were later understood as evidence of overarching 
deficits in self-regulation (Barkley, 1997a).   
 Though there is now some general agreement that impaired physical and emotional self-
regulation is at the heart of ADHD, the cause of this impairment is still a source of debate. Most 
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theorists propose neurobiological/neurocognitive explanations, with some attributing the 
impaired self-regulation to deficits in executive functioning (or top-down cognitive processing), 
and others attributing it to deficits in reactive (or bottom-up) response systems. However, there is 
a small but growing body of literature suggesting a more complex etiological model of ADHD – 
a psychodynamic-developmental model that takes into account relational and intrapsychic factors 
along with neuropsychological ones. 
 Neuropsychological theories of etiology. 
 Those who emphasize the role of reactive response systems in ADHD suggest that 
children with the disorder are hypersensitive to environmental stimulation. They believe that the 
emotional dysregulation, impulsivity, and externalizing behaviors exhibited by many children 
with ADHD are related to impairments in reactive inhibition, or a reduced ability to respond to 
novel stimuli with appropriate levels of anxiety, which can cause them to appear sensation-
seeking (Blaskey, Harris & Nigg, 2008). Sikstrom and Soderlund (2007) suggest that a 
dysfunctional and hypoactive dopamine system may be the cause of this hypersensitivity to 
environmental stimulation. 
 Those who emphasize executive functioning, on the other hand, suggest that children 
with ADHD have trouble altering an understanding or behavior in response to new information 
in order to maintain progress toward a goal (Barkley, 1997b; Quay, 1997; Nigg, 2001; Blaskey et 
al., 2008). In this way, ADHD can be understood as a deficit in executive inhibition, which in 
turn impairs other executive functions such as nonverbal working memory, internalization of 
speech, and self-regulation of affect, motivation, and arousal (Barkley, 1997b). Due to their 
impaired executive inhibition, therefore, individuals with ADHD “are less able to covertly sense 
to themselves, speak to themselves, motivate and emote to themselves, and manipulate and 
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reconstitute their own behavior to themselves and to others of their age” (Barkley, 1997a, p. 
348). It is much harder for such people to internalize their behavior, and this is what hinders the 
development of their self-regulation skills. 
Psychodynamic-developmental theories of etiology. 
 Gilmore (2000, 2002), a psychodynamic theorist, similarly suggests that difficulties with 
internalization are at the core of the impaired self-regulation exhibited by individuals with 
ADHD. However, she understands this difficulty as a deficit not in executive functioning, but in 
ego functioning. Gilmore (2000) argues that the symptoms of inattention, impulsivity and 
hyperactivity characteristic of ADHD are due to “a disturbance in the synthetic, organizing, and 
integrative function of the ego” (p. 1260). This synthetic capacity supports cognitive functioning 
as well as personality development by facilitating the modulation of drive and defense, the 
internalization of important relationships, the development of the superego, the balancing of 
internal and external stimuli, and the development of the capacity for self-observation and self-
reflection. It is by performing all these functions that the synthetic capacity supports the 
development of self-regulation. Gilmore (2000) believes that “inconsistency and variability” of 
the synthetic function in children with ADHD causes them to become easily dysregulated in 
response to intense affect and anxiety (p. 1288). Experiences that stir up these emotions, such as 
social interactions, transitions, and unexpected changes, tend to be particularly “disruptive and 
disorganizing” for such children, and can cause them to appear overly excited and anxious or 
oddly constricted and calm (Gilmore, 2000, p. 1289).  
 Gnaulati (2008) similarly argues that ADHD is best understood as a deficit of “self-
regulation of emotion in social contexts,” pointing out that children who are “easily emotionally 
flooded” are likely to be hyper-vigilant, and consequently, inattentive and restless (p. xiii). He 
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places special emphasis on the relational components of the disorder, suggesting that various 
types of mis-attunement between child and caregiver during the first three years of life can result 
in a tendency towards emotional dysregulation. Citing the work of infant researchers such as 
Schore and Tronick, Gnaulati emphasizes the detrimental impact of early “asynchronous 
exchanges” between infant and caregiver “without speedy external provision of care that restores 
emotional equilibrium” (p. 8). However, he expands this developmental model to include 
moments of mis-attunement in toddlerhood. He proposes that toddlers who are “consistently met 
with indifference, disregard, or belittlement” in response to their developmentally appropriate 
displays of prowess are likely to become mired in a vicious cycle of exhibitionism and 
hyperactivity in a desperate attempt to receive the parental recognition they so crave (p. 11). 
Because toddlers are often less capable in reality than they imagine themselves to be, they are 
already prone to intense feelings of shame. Gnaulati argues that toddlers whose parents are often 
invalidating are more likely to be “flooded with primitive feelings of shame and rage, which can 
have profound fragmenting and debilitating effects” (p. 12). He sees these emotions as central to 
the disorganized thinking and behaving common to children with ADHD. 
 Similarly, Morrel (1998) suggests that a particular vulnerability to narcissistic injury and 
resultant feelings of shame – and attempts to defend against these and protect self-esteem – are at 
the heart of the inattentive, impulsive and hyperactive symptoms that characterize ADHD. 
Morrel proposes a model of ADHD that takes into account “biological, relational, and cultural 
factors” (p. 135). He emphasizes the inextricable connection between temperament, interpersonal 
interactions, and affect expression and tolerance, arguing for a “temperament/goodness-of-fit 
model” that takes into account not only the accordance of the parent-child relationship, but also 
the goodness-of-fit between the child’s temperament and the expectations of her school, 
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community, and culture. He emphasizes the link between relationships and affects and explains 
the role of narcissism in ADHD as follows: 
 (a) children can be expected to act in ways that will protect their self-esteem, (b) self-
esteem is invariably contingent on the quality of one’s relationships, and (c) both the 
range of one’s self-esteem-protecting maneuvers and the range of one’s possible 
relationships are determined by those affects one can tolerate and those that must be 
defended against and avoided. (pp. 132-133) 
 Thus, a common theme across etiological theories is the understanding that children with 
ADHD tend to experience their internal and external worlds as tumultuous and overwhelming. A 
psychodynamic understanding attributes this sense of tumult to an impaired capacity to cope 
with strong emotion (their own and others’), which is rooted in early experiences of relational 
mis-attunement, resulting in a fragile sense of self and a vulnerability to narcissistic injury. The 
ego defense mechanisms of such children are unable to adequately protect them from unpleasant 
affective experiences and maintain their self-esteem.  
Defense Mechanisms of Children with ADHD 
 The literature on ADHD suggests that children with the disorder are overly sensitive to 
environmental and affective stimulation, easily dysregulated, and tend to struggle in the 
academic and social realms. Moreover, this tendency toward dysregulation is apparent in early 
childhood and may even exist from birth. The world of a child with ADHD, therefore, is one of 
generally heightened stress and anxiety. It seems likely, then, that when compared to their non-
ADHD peers, children with ADHD will rely more frequently on their defenses. Moreover, 
because children with ADHD have likely experienced heightened anxiety in early childhood, we 
can expect them to overuse and retain the defenses available during early childhood as they grow 
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older. Thus, the defense use of children with ADHD will likely look more immature than that of 
their peers without the disorder. The present study will investigate the defense use of children 
with ADHD by examining their responses to The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan & 
Murray, 1935). 
The Thematic Apperception Test 
 The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan & Murray, 1935) is a projective 
measure made up of 20 cards, each showing a black and white image about which an individual 
is asked to make up a story. Though Murray recommended administering the TAT in two 1-hour 
sessions of 10 cards each, today clinicians usually administer the TAT in one session consisting 
of 10 cards or less (Gieser & Stein, 1999). Most of the indistinct and gloomy images on the cards 
depict people alone or with others in ambiguous situations. In some cards, the viewer can see the 
face(s) of the person(s) pictured, while in others, the subject(s) of the card is(are) turned away 
from the viewer. In some cards, a weapon, such as a gun or knife may be perceived. For each 
image, the individual is asked the following five questions: 1) What is happening in the picture? 
2) What led up to it? 3) What will happen next? 4) What are the characters thinking? 5) What are 
the characters feeling?  The cards are thought to vary in their level of morbidity and 
consequently to elicit stories of varying emotional tone. Specific descriptions of the cards used in 
this study can be found in Appendix B.   
 At its essence, the TAT is an emotional problem-solving task under morbid conditions 
(Tuber, 2012). It requires the respondent to perceive and tolerate often intense negative affect, as 
well as weave these perceptions into a coherent narrative. It is based on the psychoanalytic 
assumption that “when someone attempts to interpret a complex social situation he is apt to tell 
as much about himself as he is about the phenomena on which attention is focused” (Morgan & 
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Murray, p. 289). Responses to the TAT are thought to expose an individual’s fantasies, wishes, 
and fears, “reveal information about one’s relationships with lovers, friends, parents, and 
authority figures, [and provide] insight [into] an individual’s life view, including self-concept 
and characteristic coping styles in facing emotional conflict” (Gieser & Stein, p. 3). 
High vs. Low Arousal Cards 
 Several studies have attempted to document normative responses to the TAT, mainly in 
terms of the most common narrative themes and emotional reactions to each card. The results 
suggest that the cards pull for a range of responses, with certain cards eliciting stories with more 
negative emotions and themes than others. Murstein et al. (1961) scaled all 20 of the TAT cards 
based on the hostility perceived in each card. Of the cards used in this study, the following are 
presented in order from least to most perceived hostility:  2, 1, 13B, 7GF, 4, 8BM, 12M, 3BM. 
Moreover, there are eight cards on the scale in between cards 7GF and 4, suggesting that card 4 
and those above it on the scale are seen as picturing substantially more hostility than card 7GF 
and those below it. Similarly, according to Eron, Terry, and Callahan (1948), of the cards used in 
this study, subjects ranked the following cards in order from least to most sad: 1, 7GF, 2, 8BM, 
12M, 4, 13B, 3BM. Latko-Ryan (2000) also found card 3BM highly likely to elicit stories with 
themes of depression and sadness.   
 Clearly, there are overlaps between those images that subjects tend to find hostile and 
those that subjects tend to find sad. Cards 3BM, 4, and 12M seem to arouse some sort of 
negative emotion (be it anger or sadness) in most people. In addition to these three cards, card 
8BM has also been found to consistently inspire stories with negative moods and themes of 
aggression, hostility, violence and death (Eron, 1950; Garfield & Eron, 1948; Holt, n. d.). 
Indeed, in a study of sailors’ responses to certain TAT cards, Auld, Eron and Laffal (1955) found 
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that 78% of subjects told aggressive stories to card 8BM. Additionally, 49% of sailors told 
sexual stories to card 4, suggesting that they also found this card highly arousing.  
 For the purposes of this study, the cards administered have been grouped into a high 
arousal group (i.e. those cards that can be expected to pull for stories with negative moods and 
themes) and a low arousal group (i.e. those cards that can be expected to pull for more neutral or 
positive stories). The high arousal group is made up of cards 3BM, 4, 8BM, and 12M. The low 
arousal group is made up of cards 1, 2, 7GF, 13B. Because of their hyper-sensitivity to negative 
affect, children with ADHD are expected to employ a greater number of defenses in general, and 
more primitive defenses in particular, to the high arousal cards. More specific hypotheses will be 
discussed in chapter two.  
The TAT as a Measure of Defense  
 The TAT is understood as a measure of unconscious dynamics, including defense 
mechanisms. According to Holt (1999), David Rapaport taught that an individual’s “ego 
structure” or “defensive/coping style” could be assessed via the TAT (p. 100). According to 
Cramer (2006), the TAT is particularly well suited for both eliciting and assessing defense 
mechanism use because of its novel and morbid stimuli, and open-ended format. The 
presentation of affectively stimulating images, along with the demand for extemporized material 
in response to these images, is likely to provoke anxiety, especially if the storyteller feels 
scrutinized and judged by the administrator. Thus, during the TAT, the storyteller is likely to 
activate his defenses in an attempt to reduce the anxiety stirred up by the task. Additionally, 
“because defense mechanisms are rather complex mental processes, they are more likely to be 
revealed in relatively extensive samples of verbal behavior than in single-word responses” 
(Cramer, 2006, p. 297). The open-ended storytelling format of the TAT provides multiple 
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samples of an individual’s unhampered thought process and content, which can then be analyzed 
for defense use by two or more independent observers. Cramer (1990, 2006) developed the 
Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM) in order to score defense use in TAT responses. The 
present study will use the DMM to score and compare the defense use of children with and 
without ADHD. 
 The TAT is particularly appropriate for eliciting defense use in children with ADHD for a 
number of reasons. First, because “circumstances or tasks that involve the generation of novel 
responses most heavily tax the type of behavioral inhibition and self-regulation” that is 
especially difficult for children with ADHD (Barkley, 1997a, p. 68), it is thought that the TAT 
will be particularly stressful for these children. Moreover, because children with ADHD are 
easily dysregulated by affective stimulation, particularly when it is related to social interaction, it 
is thought that the morbid quality and social undercurrents of the cards will be highly arousing 
for these children. Finally, because the cards vary in level of stimulation, it will be interesting to 
examine which cards seem to elicit the most defense use overall and the most immature defense 
use in particular.  
Study Rationale 
 It is hoped that this study will contribute to the field in several ways. First, though a small 
body of psychoanalytic literature exists on the defense mechanism use of children with learning 
disorders (Midgen, 1998; Rothstein & Glenn, 1999), an extensive literature search yielded no 
empirical research on the defense mechanism use of children with ADHD. The present study will 
begin to address this hole in the literature by examining the defense mechanism use of children 
with ADHD and comparing it to that of children without the disorder. Second, the sample of the 
study is comprised of children from minority ethnic groups living in a lower- to middle-income 
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American urban community, a population that is underrepresented in the literature. Third, the 
results of the study should contribute to a more precise understanding of the intrapsychic 







 The participants of this study were 37 school-aged children who were selected from a 
pre-existing data set compiled as part of a project funded by the National Institute on Deafness 
and Communication Disorders (NICDC), which examined attention and language impairments in 
children living in Upper Manhattan (Gomes, Wolfson and Halperin, 2007). Children were 
referred to the project by a parent or teacher due to behavioral or reading problems in school. All 
participants reported normal hearing and normal or corrected to normal vision, and passed a 
hearing screen. Several of the children included in the ADHD sample had comorbid diagnoses of 
anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and conduct disorder, as 
assessed by the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia for School Aged Children 
(KSADS; Kaufman et al., 1997).  
 Children were excluded from the larger NIDCD project and thus the present study if they 
had a chronic medical or neurological illness, a history of neurological problems, if they were 
taking systemic medication, if they received a diagnosis of schizophrenia, major affective 
disorder, autism, pervasive developmental disorder, or a chronic tic disorder, or if they were not 
attending school. Furthermore, children were excluded from this study if they failed to achieve a 
score of 80 or better on either the Test of Nonverbal Intelligence-Third Edition (TONI; Brown, 
Sherbenou, & Johnsen, 1990) or the performance composite scale of the Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Psychological Corporation, 1999), or if they were found to have an 
expressive language score below 80 on the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals – 
Third Edition or Fourth Edition (CELF-3; Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 1995; CELF-4; Semel, Wiig, 
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& Secord, 2004), because the presence of an intellectual disability or expressive language 
disorder would likely interfere with the production of verbal responses to the TAT. 
 Children were placed in the clinical or comparison groups based on the composite ratings 
of parents, teachers, and examiners on the DSM-IV ADHD rating scale (DuPaul, Power, & 
Anastopoulos, 1997). These ratings were analyzed using the ‘or’ algorithm used by Nigg and 
colleagues (Huang-Pollock, Nigg, & Carr, 2005; Huang-Pollock, Nigg, & Halperin, 2006; Nigg, 
Blaskey, & Stawicki, 2004), which integrates information from multiple sources following the 
DSM-IV field trials validity data (Lahey et al., 1994). If any of the three informants (i.e. parent, 
teacher, and examiner) endorsed a particular ADHD symptom in the child, it was considered 
present. These scores were then aggregated into a total score for the inattentive and hyperactive 
categories, reflecting the total number of unique symptoms endorsed by at least one of the 
informants for each category.  
Measures 
DSM-IV Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) Rating Scale (DuPaul et al., 1997) 
 The ADHD Rating Scale, which is used to assess symptoms of ADHD, was completed by 
each child’s parent, teacher, and examiner independently. The self-report scale includes 18 items, 
which correspond to the 18 diagnostic criteria (nine hyperactive/impulsive and nine inattentive) 
outlined in the DSM-IV. Each item is assessed on a 4-point scale. The DSM-IV ADHD Rating 
Scale has been found to demonstrate strong convergent, discriminant, predictive and factorial 
validity; as well as high internal consistency and test-retest reliability when administered by 
teachers and parents (DuPaul, 1991; DuPaul, 1998) as well as by clinicians (Faries et al., 2001; 
Zhang et al., 2005). Inter-rater reliability has been found to be moderately high (correlations 
35	
	
ranged from .46-.59) between ratings of teachers and parents (DuPaul, 1991), and high (.78-.89) 
between ratings of clinicians (Zhang et al., 2005).  
Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia for School Aged Children (KSADS; 
Kaufman et al., 1997)   
 Parents of participants were given the KSADS, a clinician-administered structured 
diagnostic interview, which was used to assess comorbid diagnoses in the sample, specifically 
diagnoses of: anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and conduct 
disorder. The KSADS has demonstrated strong concurrent validity with other diagnostic 
measures, high inter-rater reliability (range: 93% to 100%), and excellent test-retest reliability for 
diagnoses of major depression, bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, conduct disorder, 
and oppositional defiant disorder (k coefficients ranged from .77 to 1.00) (Kaufman et al., 1997). 
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan & Murray, 1935)  
 The TAT is a projective measure used to assess many aspects of an individual’s internal 
experience. Clinicians and researchers have used the TAT consistently since 1943, when the 
current set of cards was first published. Early studies found the measure to exhibit “adequate 
validity and reliability” (Latko-Ryan, 2000, p. 3). Surveys suggest that clinical psychologists 
“rank the TAT among the top four or five tests in most settings” (Gieser & Stein, 1999, p. 6), 
usually placing it below the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), the Bender Gestalt Visual Motor Test, and the 
Rorschach Inkblot test. Though this longstanding “survival in the free market cannot be cited as 
formal evidence of validity,” it does suggest that there is a consensus in the field about the test’s 
“clinical usefulness” (Holt, 1999, p. 99). The TAT protocol for this study consisted of the 
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following eight cards, which were presented in numerical order: 1, 2, 3BM, 4, 7GF, 8BM, 12M, 
13B. Descriptions of these cards can be found in Appendix B.     
Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM; Cramer, 1990, 2006)   
 The DMM is a standardized method of scoring the use of three defenses – denial, 
projection, and identification – in the stories told to TAT cards. The scoring for each defense is 
based on seven categories, each designed to reflect a different aspect of the defense (listed in 
Table 2). Evidence of any of these 21 categories in the story of a participant is scored as one 
point (with the exception of direct repetitions, which are only scored once). Points can then be 
summed to yield scores for each of the three defenses. Relative scores for each defense can then 
be computed by dividing the score for each individual defense by the total number of responses 
(Porcerelli et al., 1998; Cramer, 1987; Cramer & Gaul, 1998). For ease of understanding, this 
relative score can then be converted to a percentage. For example, if a subject had 15 denial 
responses out of 40 total responses, the relative score for denial would be 37%. The DMM 
scoring manual, with explicit descriptions and examples for the scoring of each category can be 
found in Appendix A. 
 Several studies using the DMM have demonstrated high inter-rater reliability on all three 
defenses, with the Pearson or intraclass correlations ranging from .71-.95 for denial, .71-.88 for 
projection, and .74-.93 for identification (Cramer, 2006). Hibbard et al. (1994) investigated the 
psychometric properties of the DMM and found evidence to support its reliability, internal 
consistency, and three-factor structure, as well as the criterion and divergent validity of the three 
defense measures. Several studies have provided empirical evidence for the construct validity of 
the DMM by showing both that the three different defenses appear to become prominent at three 
different ages (Cramer, 1987, 1990, 2006; Porcerelli et al., 1998) and that experimentally 
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induced stress is associated with increased defense use (Cramer & Gaul, 1988). For the present 
study, two raters (the author and an outside rater), who were blind to the clinical status and sex of 
the children, coded the TAT protocols using the DMM. Inter-rater reliability was established on 
25% of the protocols.  
Table 2. DMM Scoring Categories by Defense 
 Denial Projection Identification 
1 Omission of major 
characters or objects 
Attribution of aggressive/hostile or any 
other normatively unusual feelings, 
emotions, or intentions 
Emulation of skills 




3 Reversal Magical or circumstantial thinking Regulation of 
motives or 
behavior 




5 Denial of Reality Apprehensiveness about death, injury, 
or assault 
Work; delay of 
gratification 
6 Overly maximizing the 
positive or minimizing the 
negative 
Themes of pursuit, entrapment, and 
escape 
Role differentiation 
7 Unexpected goodness, 
optimism, positiveness, 
gentleness 
Bizarre or very unusual story or theme Moralism 
 
Design 
 The present study employed a mixed between-within nonequivalent group design to 
explore the characteristic defense use of children with ADHD and compare it to that of children 
without the disorder. The level of affective stimulation per TAT card was the independent 
variable, and the quantity and quality of defense use was the dependent variable. Because the 
TAT cards vary in level of morbidity and theme, they were expected to inspire varying levels of 
defense use in both groups, but these variations were expected to be more pronounced in the 
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clinical group. The study employed a between-subjects design in that the clinical group and the 
comparison group were compared on their defense use overall. It employed a within-subjects 
design in that within each group, the responses to each card were compared to determine whether 
some cards pulled for more and more primitive defense use than others. 
Procedure 
 Testing was performed in a small, quiet testing room. Each child was administered the 
TAT as part of a battery of language, attention, and intelligence testing, over the course of two 
morning sessions. The TAT was usually administered toward the end of testing on the second 
day. The TAT was administered to the participants in the standardized manner outlined by 
Morgan and Murray (1935). Namely, participants were asked to tell a story for each card about 
what is happening at present, what happened before, what will happen after, and what the 
pictured people are thinking and feeling. If a participant forgot to include any of these five 
components, he was prompted to do so by the interviewer. Responses were transcribed and tape-
recorded for confirmation of written transcription.  
Hypotheses 
 The preceding review of literature suggests support for the following hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis (1): Because children with ADHD are overly sensitive to environmental and 
affective stimulation, they will employ defense mechanisms more frequently in response to the 
TAT than will children without the disorder.  
Hypothesis (2): In keeping with the concept of Cramer’s (1997) developmental model of 
defense, which holds that early experiences of distress cause an over-reliance on those defenses 
available in early childhood, school-aged children with ADHD will employ more denial than 
children without the disorder.  
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Hypothesis (3): Based on previous studies of normative responses to the TAT, the cards 
in this study were separated into “high arousal” and “low arousal” groups. It is hypothesized that 
those cards designated as “high arousal” will elicit significantly more defense mechanisms than 
those designated as “low arousal”.  
Hypothesis (4): Because children with ADHD are particularly sensitive to negative affect, 
they will employ more immature defenses (denial and projection) in response to the high arousal 






This chapter presents the results of the current study. It begins by describing the 
demographics of the participants. Next, interrater reliability on the DMM is reported, followed 
by descriptive statistics for all variables. Finally, the analyses to address the specific hypotheses 
and post-hoc analyses are described and results reported. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Demographic Characteristics 
 The participants were 37 children (12 girls and 25 boys) ranging in age from 7.0 to 10.0 
years, with a mean age of 8.42 years (SD = .80 years). The sample was predominantly male (n = 
25, 67.6%). According to parent-report of the children’s race/ethnicity, the majority of 
participants identified as non-white (n = 21, 56.8%), with 48.6% identifying as African 
American, and 37.8% as Latino/Hispanic. Ten children were identified as White (27%), two as 
American Indian (5.4%) and one as Asian (2.7%). All of the children were fluent in English and 
enrolled in English-only classrooms, but 9 children (24.3%) were described by their parents as 
bilingual. Of the total sample, 23 (62.2%) children met criteria for the ADHD group and 14 
(37.8%) met criteria for the comparison group. The demographic characteristics of the study 





















Latino/Hispanic 14 (37.8%) 10 (40%) 4 (33.3%) 
White 10 (27.0%)   7 (28%) 3 (25%) 
American Indian  
Asian 
 
  2   (5.4%) 
  1   (2.7%) 
2 (5.4%) 
  2   (8%) 
  1   (4%) 
 
0   (0%) 












 The TAT protocols were coded by the author and an advanced doctoral candidate using 
the DMM. After they extensively self-trained using the DMM manual and protocols not used in 
the current data set, and consulted with their supervisor, they each coded 10 randomly selected 
protocols (approximately 25%). Coders were blind to demographic and diagnostic data. To test 
their inter-rater reliability, a two way mixed model intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was 
computed using absolute agreement as the standard. ICC values were found to range from good 
(.60-.74) to excellent (>.75); .60 for Denial, .64 for Identification, and .82 for Projection, 
indicating adequate reliability between raters. The remaining protocols were then coded by the 
author.  
Summary Statistics 
 The data was examined to assess normality prior to hypothesis testing. No missing 
information or coding errors were discovered. Measures of central tendency, skew, and kurtosis 
for the DMM scores can be found in Table 4. Three total defense use scores were calculated for 
each participant: 1) sum of defense responses to all eight TAT cards, 2) sum of responses to the 
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four high arousal cards, and 3) sum of responses to the four low arousal cards. All three of these 
variables were found to be highly skewed and kurtotic, indicating they are best understood as 
count data rather than as continuous data. Consequently, non-parametric analyses were 
performed on these variables. Next, relative scores for each defense type (i.e. denial, projection, 
identification) were computed for each participant as the proportion of total defense use. These 





Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Outcome Measures 
Variable n M SD Skew Kurtosis 
Total Defense  37 30.65 17.85  1.86  3.19 
Relative Denial 37 36.71** 15.27  0.89  1.07 
Relative Projection 37 40.64** 16.29 -0.13 -1.04 
Relative Identification 37 22.65** 16.16  0.36 -0.74 
Total Defense High Cards 37 16.62 10.04  2.16  5.50 
Relative Denial High Cards 37 39.65** 18.74  0.65  1.24 
Relative Projection High Cards 37 45.51** 18.64 -0.34 -1.09 
Relative Identification High Cards 37 14.83** 13.52  0.72 -0.18 
Total Defense Low Cards 37 14.03 10.07  2.73  9.61 
Relative Denial Low Cards 37 34.05** 21.00  0.82  0.51 
Relative Projection Low Cards 37 33.50** 21.90  0.54 -0.02 
Relative Identification Low Cards 37 32.46** 25.37 -0.62 -0.30 
ADHD Total Defense  23 30.00 15.23  1.37  2.07 
ADHD Total Defense High Cards 23 16.70  9.52  1.59  3.42 
ADHD Total Defense Low Cards 23 13.30  6.73  0.93  0.36 
No Dx Total Defense 14 31.71 22.09  2.11  3.42 
No Dx Total Defense High Cards 14 16.50 11.22  2.98  9.96 






At the time of this writing, no appropriate norms exist for the DMM. That said, the 
relative defense use scores of this sample were statistically equivalent to those obtained from a 
sample of demographically similar elementary school students (Porcerelli, et al., 1998) as 
presented in table 5. However, the trends toward significance in the t-tests of denial and 
identification suggest that the current sample may have presented as less mature than that of the 
comparison sample in that it exhibited more denial and less identification.  
Table 5. DMM Comparisons 
 Porcerelli, et al., (1998) (n = 29)         Current Study (n = 37) 
Denial M = 32.86, SD = 23.25 M = 36.71, SD = 15.27 
 t (36) = 1.534, p = 0.13 
Projection M = 40.41, SD = 21.81 M = 40.64, SD = 16.29 
 t (36) = 0.087, p = 0.93 
Identification M = 26.66, SD = 20.85 M = 22.65, SD = 16.16 
 t (36) = -1.511, p = 0.14 
 
Relationships among Subscales 
 Pearson correlations were computed to test the intercorrelations amongst the relative 
defense scores. The results were as follows: Denial and Projection, r(35) = -0.48, p = 0.003; 
Denial and Identification, r(35) = -0.46, p = 0.004, and Projection and Identification, r(35) = -
0.56, p < 0.001, indicating that as the use of one defense increased, the use of any other 




Relationships of Demographic Variables to Outcome Measures 
 Of all the demographic variables (age, gender, ethnicity, bilinguality) only age was found 
to be significantly associated with defense use. Pearson correlations indicate that with age the 
relative use of denial decreased (r(35) = -0.34, p = 0.04) and the relative use of identification 
increased (r(35) = 0.43, p = 0.007). Age was not significantly correlated with the relative use of 
projection (r(35) = -0.11, p = .502). One-way analyses of covariance controlling for age were 
conducted to determine whether there were differences in the relative use of the three defenses 
based on clinical status. Regardless of clinical status, age was found to be a significant predictor 
of the use of both denial (F[2, 34] = 4.221, p = .048) and identification (F[2, 34] = 7.634, p = 
.009) in response to the total card set, accounting for 11% and 18.3% of the variance of each 
defense, respectively, as measured by eta squared. However, age was not found to be a 
significant predictor of the relative use of projection in response to the total card set (F[2, 34] = 
0.419, p = .522), accounting for only 1.2% of the variance in projection as measured by eta 
squared. Given this significant age effect, all subsequent analyses were conducted while 
controlling for age of participants. Additional (insignificant) demographic comparisons are 




Table 6. Demographic Comparisons 
 Gender Race/Ethnicity Language 
 Boys  





Non White  
n = 21 
English  
n = 26 
Bilingual  




SD = 11.22 
M = 34.40 
SD = 14.56 
M = 40.47 
SD = 16.55 
M = 37.85 
SD = 15.43 
M = 35.84 
SD = 16.33 




SD = 18.41 
M = 41.79, 
SD = 16.95 
M = 37.38, 
SD = 15.79 
M = 38.95, 
SD = 16.52 
M = 45.58, 
SD = 16.13 




SD = 12.87 
M = 23.81 
SD = 16.61 
M = 22.16, 
SD = 17.04 
M = 23.18, 
SD = 17.02 
M = 18.58, 
SD = 12.44 
 t(35) = -1.035, p = 0.308 t(29) = 0.255, p = 0.801 t(33) = 0.743, p = 0.463 
 
Tests of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I: Relationship Between ADHD and Total Defense Use 
 Hypothesis I predicted that children in the clinical group would employ more defense 
mechanisms in response to the TAT than those in the comparison group. Because the total 
defense use variable was determined to be count data, a negative binomial regression was 
performed to examine the relationship between total defense use and clinical status while 
controlling for age of participant. Contrary to expectation, the results suggest that clinical status 
is not a significant predictor of defense use (X²Q (1) = .107, p = .74). To confirm this result, an 
additional non-parametric analysis was run to compare the total defense use of the clinical and 
comparison groups. A Mann-Whitney test found no significant difference between the 
distributions of the total defense use of the ADHD group (Mdn = 26) and comparison group 
(Mdn = 25), U = 157, p = .90. The effect size was very small, with only 0.04% of the variance in 
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total defense use explained by diagnosis as measured by r2. Thus, contrary to the hypothesis, 
children with ADHD did not present as more defensive overall in response to the TAT.  
Hypothesis II: Relationship Between ADHD and Use of Denial 
Hypothesis II predicted that children in the clinical group would employ more denial than 
those in the comparison group. That is, relative to their overall defense use, children in the 
ADHD group would exhibit a higher proportion of denial than the children in the non-clinical 
group. A one-way analysis of covariance controlling for age was conducted to determine whether 
there were differences in relative denial based on clinical status. No significant differences were 
found (F[2, 34] = .205, p = .65). The effect size, as measured by eta squared, was very small, 
with only 0.6% of the variability in relative denial being explained by diagnosis. Thus, contrary 
to the hypothesis, children with ADHD did not exhibit a higher proportion of denial than 
children without the disorder.    
Hypothesis III: Relationship Between Arousal Level of TAT Card and Defense Use 
Hypothesis III predicted that those cards designated as “high arousal” would elicit 
significantly more defense mechanisms than those designated as “low arousal”. A generalized 
linear mixed model using a Poisson distribution (used for modeling count data) was conducted to 
compare total defenses elicited by low arousal cards to those elicited by high arousal cards while 
controlling for age. Arousal level was entered as a fixed factor. The results indicate that arousal 
level was not associated with number of defenses, F[1,71] = 1.464, p = .23. To confirm this 
result, an additional non-parametric test was run to compare the distributions of the total 
responses to the high and low arousal card sets. A related samples Friedman’s two way analysis 
of variance by ranks found no difference between the responses to the two sets of cards, F[1, 71] 
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= 3.457, p = .06. Thus, the children did not present as more defensive overall in response to the 
high arousal cards, contrary to the hypothesis. 
Hypothesis IV: Relationship Between ADHD, Arousal Level of TAT Card, and Defense Use 
Hypothesis IV predicted that children in the clinical group would employ more immature 
defenses (denial and projection) in response to the high arousal cards than children in the 
comparison group. That is, relative to their overall defense use, children in the ADHD group 
would exhibit a higher proportion of immature defenses to the high arousal cards than the 
children in the non-clinical group. The relative denial and relative projection variables were 
combined to create a relative immature defense variable. A one-way analysis of covariance 
controlling for age was then conducted to determine whether there were differences in relative 
immature defense use in response to the high arousal cards based on clinical status. No 
significant differences were found (F[2, 34] = .000, p = .987), with 0% of the variability in 
relative immature defense being explained by diagnosis, as measured by eta squared. Thus, the 
children with ADHD did not respond to the high arousal cards with more immature defenses 
than the children in the comparison group, contrary to the hypothesis. 
Post Hoc Analyses 
 Because the hypotheses focused exclusively on denial, combined immature, and total 
defense use, post hoc analyses of projection and identification responses were conducted. 
Relative Use of Projection 
Three one-way analyses of covariance controlling for age were conducted to determine 
whether there were differences in relative use of projection based on clinical status. In response 
to the total card set, no significant differences were found (F[2, 34] = 0.079, p = .780). The effect 
size, as measured by eta squared, was very small, with only 0.02% of the variability in relative 
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projection being explained by diagnosis. Similarly, diagnosis was found to be an insignificant 
predictor of projection in response to the high arousal cards (F[2, 34] = 0.056, p = .815), and to 
the low arousal cards (F[2, 34] = 1.022, p = .319), accounting for only 0.2% and 2.9% of the 
variance in projection as measured by eta squared, respectively. Thus, clinical status was not 
found to be a significant predictor of the relative use of projection in response to the TAT.  
Relative Use of Identification 
 Three one-way analyses of covariance controlling for age were conducted to determine 
whether there were differences in relative use of identification based on clinical status. Clinical 
status was not found to be a significant predictor of the relative use of identification in response 
to all the cards (F[2, 34] = 0.585, p = .450). The effect size, as measured by eta squared, was 
very small, with only 1.7% of the variability in relative identification being explained by 
diagnosis. This was true regardless of card type; clinical status was an insignificant predictor of 
identification in response to the low arousal cards (F[2, 34] = 2.324, p = .137), and to the high 
arousal cards (F[2, 34] = 0.000, p = .987). Thus, clinical status was not found to be a significant 
predictor of the relative use of identification in response to the TAT. 
Immature Defense Responses to the Low Arousal Cards 
 Because only immature responses to the high arousal cards were examined, a one-way 
analysis of covariance controlling for age was conducted to determine whether there were 
differences in relative immature defense use in response to the low arousal cards based on 
clinical status. Clinical status was not found to be a significant predictor of immature defense use 
in response to the low arousal cards (F[2, 34] = 2.324, p = .137), accounting for only 6.4% of the 





Additional analyses were run to further compare the responses to the high and low 
arousal card sets, regardless of the subjects’ clinical status. Multivariate analyses were run to 
investigate the relationship between arousal level and defense type, while controlling for age of 
subject. Results indicated a significant arousal effect, Wilks’ λ = .58, F (2,34) = 12.425, p = .000, 
with a large effect size as measured by η² = .42. Follow-up pairwise comparisons indicated 
significant differences in the proportions of projection and identification based on arousal level 
of card. While there was no difference in the proportion of denial elicited by the high and low 
arousal card sets ( 𝑋  difference = 5.606, p = 1.97), the high arousal cards were found to elicit 
significantly more projection ( 𝑋  difference = 12.018, p = .003) and significantly less 










 The present study aimed to gain insight into the intrapsychic process of affect regulation 
of children with ADHD. Participants’ responses to the TAT were examined for evidence of 
defense mechanisms using the empirically validated DMM scale (Cramer, 1990, 2006). A 
literature review provided support for the hypotheses that ADHD and arousal level of TAT card 
could be significant predictors of the quantity and quality of defense mechanisms employed. 
Results indicated, however, that only TAT card arousal level was associated with defense use, 
regardless of clinical status or age. Additionally, age was found to be a significant predictor of 
defense use, regardless of clinical status. Thus, while the results do not expand our understanding 
of ADHD in the ways expected, they do provide empirical support for Cramer’s stage theory of 
defense development, as well as contribute to the existing body of literature on patterns of TAT 
responses. This final chapter will explore the implications of the significant findings, provide 
possible explanations for the insignificant findings, discuss limitations of the present study, and 
propose directions for future research.  
Significant Findings 
Empirical Support for Cramer’s Stage Theory of Defense 
According to Cramer (1987, 1998, 2006), the use of denial is predominant in early 
childhood and decreases with age, replaced first by the use of projection – which is most salient 
during latency – and then ultimately supplanted by the use of identification, which gains 
prominence in adolescence. The results of the present study provide empirical support for this 
developmental model. Indeed, age was found to be significantly associated with defense use, 
regardless of clinical status. More specifically, one-way analyses of covariance found age to be a 
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significant predictor of the use of denial and identification in response to the total card set, and 
Pearson correlations indicated that as age increased, the relative use of denial decreased and the 
relative use of identification increased, as predicted by Cramer’s model.  
Additionally, the intercorrelations amongst the relative defense scores were all found to 
be significant and negative, indicating that as the use of one defense increased, the use of any 
other decreased (and vice versa). Though the direction of these correlations differs from those 
reported in another study of school children (Porcerelli, et al., 1998), they seem in line with 
Cramer’s stage-based theory of defense development in that they indicate that the defenses 
emerge sequentially (although they remain extant to a lesser degree throughout childhood), with 
each gradually being replaced by the next in frequency of use.  
Finally, multivariate analyses comparing the responses to the high and low arousal card 
sets – controlling for the subjects’ clinical status and age – indicated a significant arousal effect, 
with a large effect size. Follow-up pairwise comparisons found the high arousal cards to elicit 
significantly more projection and significantly less identification than the low arousal cards. 
Thus, in response to the heightened stress inspired by the high arousal cards, the participants 
relied heavily on projection – the defense most readily available to children their age – whereas 
in response to the relatively less stimulating low arousal cards, they were better able to access the 
more mature defense of identification. These findings provide support for Cramer’s (2006) 
assertion that projection is the defense most salient during latency, and are in line with previous 
research which indicates that heightened stress inspires overreliance on the defense most easily 




Contribution to Literature on TAT 
The third hypothesis predicted that the high arousal card group (3BM, 4, 8BM, 12M) 
would elicit significantly more defenses overall than the low arousal card group (1, 2, 7GF, 
13B). Results indicated that two groups did not differ in the amount of defenses they elicited, but 
rather in the type of defenses they elicited (i.e. the high arousal group elicited significantly more 
projection and significantly less identification). Thus, though the specific hypothesis was not 
supported, the distinction between the two groups was in fact found to be statistically 
meaningful, as discussed above and in the previous chapter. By providing empirical evidence 
that cards 3BM, 4, 8BM and 12M are more emotionally stimulating than cards 1, 2, 7GF and 
13B, the present study both aligns with and contributes to the existing body of literature on 
normative responses to the TAT. 
Insignificant Findings 
 Contrary to expectation, no significant differences were found between the defense use of 
children with ADHD and that of children in the comparison group. There are several possible 
explanations for this discrepancy, including the nature of the sample as a whole, the nature of the 
TAT, and the nature of the DMM. 
The Sample as a Whole 
As discussed in the second chapter, participants were selected from a larger data-set 
compiled as part of a NICDC-funded project investigating attention and language impairments in 
children living in northern Manhattan (Gomes, Wolfson and Halperin, 2007). Children were 
referred to the project by a parent or teacher due to behavioral or reading problems in school and 
placed in the clinical or comparison groups based on the composite ratings of parents, teachers, 
and examiners on the DSM-IV ADHD rating scale (DuPaul, Power, & Anastopoulos, 1997). 
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Thus, though only 23 (62.2%) of the children were designated as “ADHD,” all of the children 
can be understood as exhibiting some behavioral or reading problems, muddying the distinction 
between the clinical and non-clinical groups. This may be an explanation for why the sample 
demonstrated a trend toward immaturity in defense use as compared to a sample of 
demographically similar students as discussed in the previous chapter (Porcerelli, et al., 1998).  
Additionally, it is important to point out that in forming the clinical group, no distinction 
was made between those participants who met criteria for inattentive, hyperactive or mixed types 
of ADHD, largely because of the small sample size. However, it is possible that hyperactive and 
inattentive children respond to the TAT in distinctly different ways, and this distinction obscured 
the findings, as discussed in the next section. 
Nature of the TAT and DMM   
The TAT is a story-telling task which requires a protracted and consistent period of 
concentration and verbal production. The stamina involved is a lot to ask of any child, but is a 
particularly tall-order for children with difficulty regulating their attention. The transcripts coded 
for this study indicate that many participants struggled to complete the task. Administrators often 
had to encourage children repeatedly to persevere. Several children provided markedly succinct 
stories, or refused to provide a story altogether in response to some or all of the cards. 
Conversely, a few participants produced long, convoluted stories which investigators had to 
reign in or end in order to complete the protocol in a timely fashion. As indicators of inhibition 
and disinhibition, respectively, taciturn and loquacious responses can both be interpreted as 
evidence of defensive processes. Unfortunately, only the latter is well-captured by the DMM. 
The DMM relies on verbal production; the more words a child produces, the more 
opportunities for scoring. This is problematic, in that children who are profoundly avoidant may 
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refuse to produce much, if any, content at all. Yet a refusal will only yield a score for the 
omission of whatever salient object is in that particular card (for example, refusal to provide a 
story to card 1 would result in two denial scores for omission of the boy and the violin). Whereas 
a particularly long and meandering story to card 1 could result in more than two scores. In this 
scenario, a garrulous child might look markedly more defended than a terse child when this may 
not in fact be the case. Thus, it is possible that only the defensive processes of the 
hyperactive/talkative children were well captured by the DMM and those of the 
inattentive/reticent children were underestimated. In this way, the insignificant findings can be 
taken as indicative of a weakness of the DMM rather than a disproval of the hypotheses per se. 
Study Limitations 
 There are several limitations to the current study, including aspects of the administration 
of the TAT and aspects of the sample itself. Inconsistencies in the administration of the TAT 
due to human error, including which and how often prompts were given, and whether snacks 
and/or toys were provided during administration, can be understood to limit the generalizability 
of the findings.  
Additionally, the number of participants is quite small, making the analyses under-
powered. Moreover, as a self-selecting sample, there is a lack of a clear distinction between the 
clinical and comparison groups, as well as a lack of specificity around the types of ADHD within 
the clinical group, as discussed in the previous section. As such, the implications of the few 
significant findings should be accepted with caution. Given these reservations, however, the 




Finally, the sample is made up predominantly of children of color living in a low to 
middle-income urban setting. As such, the findings may not be generalizable to the population as 
a whole. That said, the DMM findings are in line with previous studies of latency aged children 
(Cramer, 2006, 1997; Porcerelli, et al., 1998). Furthermore, the inclusion of underrepresented 
participants in this study is purposeful and a conscious step toward rectifying a longstanding 
inequity in the literature. 
Directions for Future Research 
 Future research should address these limitations by employing a larger, randomly 
selected, and more ethnically, geographically, and economically diverse sample of children. 
Analyses should separate the clinical sample into inattentive, hyperactive and mixed subgroups 
in addition to examining children with ADHD as a whole. And TATs should, of course, be 
administered as consistently as possible.  
 In the analyses of defense use, additional measures to capture verbosity should be 
considered. Adding a word-count for each story would begin to address this concern. Another 
possibility to consider is weighing scores in relation to speech paucity or overabundance.  
 Such additions should make it possible to investigate whether diagnostic types of ADHD 
present differently in both verbosity and defense use, providing the more nuanced clinical picture 
of the disorder originally sought by the present study. 
Conclusion 
 This study attempted to expand the psychodynamic understanding of children with 
ADHD and add to the nascent literature on psychiatric disorders in underrepresented 
populations. Children were selected for the study by their parents or teachers based on observed 
difficulties in behavior or reading and placed in the clinical or comparison groups based on 
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composite scores on an ADHD ratings scale. The stories they told to eight TAT cards –
designated as low or high arousal – were coded for evidence of defense mechanism use with an 
empirically validated scale. Results indicated that there was no difference between the clinical 
and comparison groups in the amount or proportion of defenses employed. Indeed, all the 
children – regardless of clinical status – employed defenses as would be expected based on their 
age and on the arousal level of the card with which they were presented. Thus, while the findings 
did not expand our understanding of the intrapsychic dimensions of ADHD in the way expected, 
they did provide further empirical support for both the existing literature on normative responses 
to the TAT, and for Cramer’s (1987, 1990, 2006) developmental model of defense, which can 
now be said to extend to this population of children of color living in an urban low and middle-










APPENDIX A: DMM SCORING MANUAL 
 
The Defense Mechanism Manual was developed to assess the use of three defenses—denial, 
projection, and identification—as revealed in stories told to standard TAT and CAT cards.  
 
Specific criteria have been developed for CAT Cards 3, 5, and 10, and for TAT Cards 1, 2, 3BM, 
3GF, 4, 5, 6BM, 6GF, 7BM, 7GF, 8BM, 8GF, 10, 12F, 12MF, 13G, 13MF, 14, 15, 17BM, 
18GF, 20, and the research Trapeze card. 
 
The scoring for each defense is based on seven categories, each designed to reflect a different 
aspect of the defense. Each category may be scored as often as necessary, with the exception of a 
direct repetition in the story; in cases of repetition, the category is scored only once. 
 
Although examples are provided to aid in deciding whether a category should be scored or not, 
inevitably questions will arise. A thorough knowledge of the nature of the defense mechanisms 
will help in answering these questions.  
 
Beyond this, the general rule to be followed is, “When in doubt, leave it out.” That is, if there is a 
serious question about whether or not the story segment is an example of the defense, do not 
score it. 
 




4. Statements of Negation 
5. Denial of Reality 
6. Overly Maximizing Positive, Minimizing Negative 
7. Unexpected Goodness, Optimism, Positiveness, Gentleness 
 
In the categories of primitive Denial, the story-teller assumes that the stimulus card is something, 
and the defense is seen in the avoidance or changing the nature of that thing. 
 
DENIAL 1. - OMISSION of Major Characters of Objects 
Failure to perceive salient stimuli that are perceived by nearly all one’s peers. This applies only 
to the major or obvious objects. Omission of any of these objects from the story is scored, 
according to the following plan. 
TAT 1: boy = 1; violin = 1  
TAT 2: girl in front = 1; pregnant woman = 1 (pregnancy must be indicated); man (or, family, 
parents) = 1 
TAT 3BM: person = 1; gun or knife = 1  
TAT 3GF: person = 1  
TAT 4: man = 1; woman = 1 




TAT 6BM: young man = 1; older woman = 1  
TAT 6GF: man = 1; woman = 1 
TAT 7BM: older man = 1; younger man = 1  
TAT 7GF: young girl = 1; woman = 1; baby or doll = 1 
TAT 8BM: gun = 1; knife = 1; standing young man = 1; prone man = 1 
TAT 8GF: woman = 1 
TAT 10: human figure 1 = 1; human figure 2 = 1  
TAT 12F: young woman = 1; old woman = 1 
TAT 12MF: standing man = 1; prone man = 1 
TAT 13G: stairway = 1; female figure = 1  
TAT 13MF: standing man = 1; prone woman = 1  
TAT 14: standing man = 1; window = 1 
TAT 15: man = 1; tombstones (graveyard) = 1  
TAT 17BM: man = 1; rope = 1 
TAT 18GF: woman above = 1; woman below = 1 
TAT 20: man standing = 1; lamppost (light) = 1  
Trapeze: man = 1; woman = 1; trapeze = 1 
 
Do not score if reference to the function of a critical object is made. For example, the knife in 
TAT 8BM may be implied by the mention of an operation, or stabbing; the gun in TAT 8BM 
may be implied by shooting; the cane in CAT 3 may be implied by reference to lameness. 
On TAT 1, reference to the object, even if not named, is sufficient. (However, if it is named 
incorrectly, score under Denial(2). On TAT 7GF, reference to “holding something” is sufficient. 
 
DENIAL 2 - MISPERCEPTION 
This may come about because the perceptual process itself is distorted due to pathology, or 
because, in the case of a child or inexperienced person the name of the object is not known, and 
the individual defensively calls it something it is not, rather than referring to it as a “thing” or an 
“object”, in which case no score is given. In this latter case, the point is whether, in a situation in 
which the individual does not have all the information needed, he is able to cope adaptively, or 
whether he must distort the situation to fit his inadequate knowledge. 
 
Examples of adaptive coping are seen in the following two stories to TAT 1; in both cases, the 
child is uncertain about how to identify the violin: 
“This person is thinking what to do, with something that is in front of him. He might use it for 
something, or something might happen. The thing that might happen is that he might think of 
something to do with the thing. (What happens?) He’s going to do something with it. He’s 
thinking what he will use it for, what it is supposed to be used for; on some kind of material, 
which is called paper.” 
“That’s a little boy. He’s down on his work bench and he’s looking this over and he’s wondering 
what it is. And he’s wondering if he’ll ever find out. He can’t wait ‘till his father comes home so 





Denial 2 (a) - Any unusual or distorted perception of a figure, object, or action in the 
picture which is without sufficient support for the observation, if and only if the projected 
image is NOT of ominous quality, in which case it would be scored under Projection 
“(TAT8BM) The man is tickling the man lying down;” “(CAT3) He’s in a wheelchair” 
“(TAT1) That’s a cross-bow;” 
“(TAT17BM) That’s a statue climbing down a rope”; “(TAT1) He’s eating;” 
“(TAT17BM) Is that a picture of me?” (S is 5 years old) (TAT10) Perceiving both characters as 
“young”; (TAT15) score “ghost” under Projection (2) 
 
Denial 2 (b) Perception of a figure as being of the opposite sex from that usually perceived 
“(TAT12M) The girl on the couch” [As of 2000, many see this figure as female. Thus, after this 
date, do not score “girl” as a Misperception] 
(TAT10) Perceiving both characters as female, or both as male. If the story-teller is an adult, 
score the following as Misperception: 
(TAT 3BM) “The child on the floor” (TAT14) “A child at the window” 
 
Note: If the story-teller misperceives an object, and then corrects the 
misperception, score Denial(2). If, after the correction, he continues to use the misperception as 
the basis for the story, score also under Denial(5). 
 
Do not score on TAT 1 if children call the violin a guitar, harp, or instrument. Do not score if 
violin is called a “thing”, “object”, or “that”. Only score when violin is turned into something 
other than a musical instrument. Do not score if violin is referred to as “homework or a “project” 
unless it is clear that this means something other than a violin - e.g., a book, a boat, etc. 
 
DENIAL 3 - REVERSAL 
The reversal may be either in terms of the usual perception of the card or in the story itself, 
especially when the reversal is normatively unusual. 
 
Denial 3 (a) Transformations such as weakness into strength, fear into courage, passivity into 
activity, and vice versa. 
“He had been king of the jungle, but now he was very old”; 
“The mouse used to be afraid; then he grew up and fought the lion”; 
“He used to be an excellent surgeon, but then he killed a man by mistake”; 
Note: If the transformation involves a drastic change for the good, score under Denial(7). 
 
Denial 3 (b) Score any figure who takes on qualities previously stated conversely in the 
story, including change of sex of figure. 
“(TAT12M) The boy is in a coma and the man is hexing him. The boy will get the man in his 
power”; “He’s dead, and he’ll come back to life.” 
“(TAT17BM) I am in a big cave and I’m caught . And he’s half way up to the top (Here the S 
has changed the threatened “I” into “he”); 
“He is an actress (S is 9 years old)” 
A character first described as a Father becomes a Grandfather, or vice versa. 
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Reversal differs from Denial(4) and Denial(6) in that it involves both ends of a continuum (e.g., 
weak-strong), rather than just one end which is negated (e.g., weak-not weak: Denial 4) or overly 
stressed (Denial 6). 
Reversal may be scored where one end of the continuum is implied but not explicitly stated 
(strength—weakness, implied by growing old). 
Do not score “growing old” by itself. 
Do not score if a character doesn’t know how to do something and then learns how. 
Do not score if character was strong, became weak through tiredness, but in the end won, or was 
strong again; or if sad, but through doing something, becomes happy. 
 
DENIAL 4. Statements of NEGATION 
Simply stating something in the negative (e.g., “He didn’t do it”) is not sufficient to be scored in 
this category. Whether or not to score a negative statement depends on whether the negation is 
defensive. Sometimes this can be determined by the fact that the negative statement is unusual or 
unexpected (e.g., “He didn’t stuff peanuts up his nose”) - i.e., that no one would have expected 
this event to happen anyway, so why point out that it didn’t happen. At other times the defensive 
nature of the negation is more straightforward (e.g., “He didn’t get hurt”). Often, only the context 
will make it clear if the statement is defensive or not. 
 
Denial 4 (a) Score if a character “does not ...” any action, wish, or intention, which, if 
acknowledged, would cause displeasure, pain or humiliation. 
“He caught the mouse but did not kill him”; “He never fell down from ropes” 
 
Denial 4 (b ) Score also statements in which the story-teller negates or denies a fact or 
feeling. 
“He is going to go hunting and catch something. I don’t know what, though” “I don’t know what 
that is (referring to whole card or part of card)”; 
“At first I thought he was dead, but he isn’t;” 
“No one is in that bed (CAT 5, referring to large bed)” “I don’t know where he is going”. 
 
Denial 4 (c) References to doubt as to what the picture is or represents. 
“What is it? I don’t understand the picture” should be scored here, and should be distinguished 
from references to difficulty in formulating a story (“I can’t think of what to say”) which is an 
example of Repression. The difference lies in the fact that Denial generally operates on a more 
concrete level, while Repression is seen in the person’s inability to think of something. 
Do not score if “I don’t know” is used as a way to end a story, or is in response to a question by 
the examiner. 
Do not score if a character wants to or tries to do something, but can’t or isn’t able to, or doesn’t 
know how to. 
Do not score if a character doesn’t like something, or doesn’t want to do something that 
is neutral or pleasant in nature (e.g, do not score “He doesn’t want to practice the violin”) Do not 
score “He doesn’t want to get hurt,” but do score “He doesn’t get hurt” 
Do not score “He does not reveal it” (a secret, a clue) here; score under PRO 4) Do not score, on 
TAT 17BM, “He’s got no clothes on”. 




DENIAL 5 - DENIAL OF REALITY 
This is an overlapping category with Denial (4) 
 
Denial 5 (a) The story-teller denies the reality of the story or situation by the use of phrases 
such as: 
“It was just a dream”; “It didn’t really happen” “It was all make-believe” 
“(TAT 8BM) That’s really a dummy; when they cut it, it was all red cotton”; “They’re going to 
play (pretend) a fight” 
“(TAT 3BM): describing the gun as cap pistol or water pistol 
Describing the picture as part of a movie 
Do not score TAT8BM if it is described as a dream, due to the nebulous atmosphere of the 
picture. 
 
Denial 5 (b) Sleeping, daydreaming or fainting as a way of avoiding something unpleasant. 
 
Denial 5 (c) References to avoiding looking at something that would be unpleasant to see, or 
hearing something that would be unpleasant to hear, or thinking something that would be 
unpleasant to think. 
“He’s walking away because he doesn’t want to see the operation” 
 
Denial 5 (d) Any perception, attribution, or implication which is blatantly false with regard 
to reality as generally defined or to reality as defined by the picture. 
“(CAT 10) The two dogs are playing checkers”; “(CAT 10, referring to crib) Nothing is in here”; 
“(CAT 10) He’s going to have puppies” 
“The dog climbs up the rope”; 
“(TAT15) He has come up out of his grave” 
“(TAT17BM) A statue climbing a rope” (score also under Denial(2) for misperception of figure 
in the picture. The score under Denial(5) is for a statue doing something which statues can not do 
in reality. 
Note: If the perception is not false so much as being unusual or distorted, including seeing the 
picture as being of the opposite sex from the usual perception, score under Denial(2). 
 





Pollyannish denial belongs to a later period of development than primitive denial, and may 
involve a rather saccharine, “life is beautiful” attitude. It is often characterized by a note of 
unfounded optimism. 
 
DENIAL 6 - Overly Maximizing the Positive or Minimizing the Negative 
Any gross exaggeration or underestimation of a character’s qualities, potency, size, power, 
beauty, or possessions. 
“(CAT3) A small lion”; 
“An old lion (weakness implied)”; “The most beautiful in the world”; 
“The biggest in the world” (referring to person, animal, or parts of these; “The eagle picks up the 
lion”; 
Note: If the exaggerated quality involves a reversal of the character’s usual nature, score under 
Denial(3). 
Do not score exaggeration of physical objects (e.g., “the highest mountain”; “he fell thousands of 
feet”) 
 
DENIAL 7. UNEXPECTED GOODNESS, OPTIMISM, POSITIVENESS, GENTLENESS 
Denial 7 (a) Unexpected goodness. 
This is a difficult category to score and should be scored only when beyond doubt. It is often 
seen in instances of revenge, when the revenge is built up to, but never consummated when the 
opportunity arises. Building up to a theme of harm and then concluding without justification that 
all is well is scored here. Also when a character “takes his lumps” or punishment or bad luck 
completely in stride when all previous indications were of an avenging “righteous indignation” 
attitude. 
“The lion chases the mouse for many hours; he finally catches him, but then he lets him go”; 
“He has always failed, but he knows that he will be successful in the end.” 
 
Denial 7 (b) Any sort of drastic change of heart for the good. 
“He is a murderer who goes around killing people. But then he decides to become a doctor and 
saves many lives”. 
 
Denial 7 (c) Also scored here are references to natural beauty, wonder, awesomeness. 
“He realized the beauty and magnificence of the forest” “She contemplated the wonder of the 
universe”. “(TAT1) He found peace with his violin” 
“(TAT14) He finds enlightenment” 
 
Denial 7 (d) Nonchalance in the face of danger. 
 
Denial 7 (e) Acceptance of one’s (negative) fate or loss, with the justification of not really 
wanting it anyway; a “sour grapes” attitude. 
“He learns to make the best out of what he’s got.” 
Note: If the change for the good involves a moralistic turn, score under Identification(7). 





PROJECTION: SUMMARY OF SCORING CATEGORIES 
1. Attribution of Aggressive or Hostile Feeling, Emotions, or Intentions to a Character, or 
Other Feelings, Emotions, or Intentions that are Normatively Unusual. 
2. Additions of Ominous People, Ghosts, Animals, Objects or Qualities. 
3. Magical or Circumstantial Thinking 
4. Concern for Protection from External Threat 
5. Apprehensiveness of Death, Injury, or Assault 
6. Themes of Pursuit, Entrapment, and Escape 
7. Bizarre or Very Unusual Story or Theme 
 
PROJECTION 1. Attribution of Aggression or Hostile Feelings, Emotions, or Intentions to 
a character, or of any other feelings, emotions or intentions that are normatively unusual. 
This category may be scored either when such emotions are attributed by the story-teller to a 
character in the story, or when one character attributes them to another character, but only if such 
attribution is without sufficient reason. References to a character’s face or eyes looking a certain 
way (e.g., anguished, puzzled, etc.) or to body “position” or “posture” are scored here. 
 
“He killed her because he hated her” (with no explanation of the reason for his hatred) [Score 
twice, once under PRO(5)]; 
“(CAT3) This is a mean lion” 
“I think he dislikes me” (unexplained); “(CAT3) The Lion growls too much”; 
“(CAT3, mouse speaking) I think that lion is thinking about getting after me”; 
“His parents don’t care, even if he’s sick” (This is a borderline case, but is scored because it is 
implied that the parents, through neglect, are mean to the child); 
“(TAT1) He is looking at it with contempt” (This is also somewhat borderline but is scored here 
because contempt includes hostility towards the object of contempt); 
“(TAT17BM) He had to find his girl friend or they would kill her (unexplained)” TAT17BM) 
Maybe he’s angry (unexplained)”; 
“(TAT17BM) “Probably that look on his face is a signal of some kind”; 
“(TAT17BM) His features become distorted and take on the look of an animal as it hides from a 
hunter”; “(TAT17BM) His look is that of frustration and great emotion (scored once)”; 
“(TAT17BM) He has a mean personality; he is a murderer (scored twice)”; “(TAT17BM) He 
was in the shower ...a fire... he feels embarrassed [due to nakedness]”; “(TAT1) He’s looking at 
it in a mad way (unexplained); 
“He’s contemplating suicide”; “(TAT4): They’re kissing” 
 
Note: Score aggressive or hostile actions under PRO(5). 
Do not score TAT 17BM for simple mention of fright, tenseness, or tiredness. Do not score TAT 
4 for woman pleading with man. 
Do not score depression or thought of suicide on TAT 13MF; if suicide is actually carried out on 
card other than TAT 13MF, score PRO(5). 
Do not score TAT 3BM or 3GF for simple mention of sadness, upset or depression, or crying, if 
reason is given. 
Do not score TAT 6GF for mention of woman looking surprised, startled.
65	
	
PROJECTION 2. -Addition of Ominous People, Ghosts, Animals, Objects or Qualities. 
Projection 2 (a) This category is scored only if the details added to the situation are of an 
ominous or potentially threatening nature. 
“(CAT3) He got an axe and killed him”; 
“(CAT3) They said if he wasn’t good they’d put him in front of alligators” 
“(CAT5) He was afraid to go to sleep because he heard scary noises ... then a robber came (score 
both for noises and for robber) (score fear of sleep under PRO5); 
“(CAT5) There are bees outside the window” “(TAT1) That’s a dangerous toy” 
“(TAT 3BM) being in “jail” 
“(TAT10) Mention of war, “going to war”. (TAT15) “ghost” 
“(TAT17BM) There are warriors coming”; 
“(TAT17BM) The guards are trying to get him (This is a borderline case; do not score for 
mention of guards alone; score only if the guards are clearly threatening; if guards are pursuing, 
score under PRO(6) only);” 
“(TAT17BM) The soldiers throw spears (score only once for the spears; the soldiers alone are 
not necessarily ominous)”; 
“fire” 
 
Do not score TAT 17BM for mention of prison, dungeon, cave, guards alone, prisoner, or 
pursuers (the latter is scored under PRO(6). 
 
Projection 2 (b) Score especially the addition of blood, mention of serious and uncommon 
illnesses, including mental illness, comas, and nightmares. “(TAT8BM) This guy got badly 
hit by malaria;” 
“(TAT12M) He finds out that the boy is in a coma”; “(TAT8BM) He has these horrible 
nightmares”. 
 
Projection 2 (c) Also, score here references to people, animals or objects being decrepit, 
falling apart, deteriorating or ‘shabby’. 
“(CAT5) This crib looks like it’s going to fall over”; 
“(CAT5) It must have been an old crib that they sent away to a place to get fixed up” “(CAT5) 
The lamp looks like it’s all cracked”; 
“(TAT1) He’s sad because one of his strings are broke; “He found his violin all over the floor all 
broken”; “He grew up in a broken home” 
 
Note: In TAT1, score for violin being broken only if the implication is that someone not in the 
picture (unknown or disliked) breaks it, or if it was broken before the story begins (i.e., was 
‘inherently’ damaged). 
 
Do not score if a friend or parent breaks it. 
Note: If the same addition is called two different things, score only once (e.g., “a bat or a black 
widow”; “a thorn, not a hornet”) 
Do not score the addition of a bullet in TAT8BM. 
Do not score TAT 17BM, rope breaking while climbing, unless prior mention is made of the 
rope being inadequate to support weight. 
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Do not score “falling apart” if this is due to some other event specified in the story, such as an 
explosion, fire, earthquake, etc., which are themselves scored. 
Do not score “sick” or “really sick” on TAT12M. Do not score hearing a noise on TAT5. 
Do not score “grave” on TAT 15 
 
PROJECTION 3. Magical, Autistic, or Circumstantial Thinking 
 
Projection 3 (a) Any use of magic or magical powers, including hypnosis or other unusual 
powers or control of one character over another; this also includes animals banding 
together to accomplish some herculean task. 
“He was thinking that he had a magic bird that followed him and saved him’; 
“The boy died and the parents got a dog, and every night they could hear the boy talking to 
him”; “He was putting spells all over the man”; 
“This hypnotist turned him into a little green thing”. 
 
Projection 3 (b) Animism: attribution of human thoughts or emotions to objects other than 
animals and people (not applicable to the ‘teddy bears’ of CAT5). 
“Canes talking”; “Rifles feeling sorry”; 
“(TAT1) The project has a problem”; “(TAT1) An idiotic violin”; 
“(TAT17BM) The rope tried to overpower him”. 
 
Projection 3 (c) Circumstantial reasoning that may have a paranoid flavor; hyperalert 
search for flaws and misleading cues (implies a mistrust of others); efforts to find hidden or 
obscure meanings; criticism of the way in which the pictures are drawn (implied is that this 
makes the task more difficult). 
“(TAT17BM)...A bobcat jumped at him. Because this is out in the woods and the door was 
open”; “(TAT17BM) It must have been a murder he committed, because he isn’t carrying any 
valuables or money”; 
“There’s probably a trick to this”; 





PROJECTION 4. Concern for Protection Against External Threat 
 
Projection 4 (a) Include here evidence for fear of external threat of physical assault or 
injury and the need for protection against that threat, as seen in the erection of walls (real 
or imaginary), use of masks, disguises, shields, armor, locking of doors or windows, or 
creation of other protective barriers. 
“(CAT3) The mouse is really worried that the lion will bring the cats in and they’ll chase the 
mice (This overlaps with PRO6, but is scored here because the emphasis is on the worry)”; 
“The king kicks him out but he puts on a disguise and gets back in again”; 
 
Projection 4 (b) Also included here are references to suspiciousness, to people or animals 
hiding or “lying in wait”, concern about being “taken by surprise”, spying on others, 
keeping a lookout, anticipation of kidnap that does not occur, or a feeling that “others are 
against you”(stated explicitly). 
“(CAT5) There’s a great big man who is under those covers”; “(CAT5) The mother and the 
father are hiding in the bed;” 
“(CAT5) There’s a crib and no one is there and they wouldn’t know if anyone stealed them”; 
“(TAT17BM) He has witnessed a crime and is being hunted by the killer” 
“(TAT5) “The mother sneaked downstairs and peeks in” 
Concern that someone is trying to pin a crime or other offense on oneself; Blackmailing 
 
Projection 4 (c) References to having seen something one shouldn’t have seen, or having 
heard something one wasn’t supposed to hear, or that will get one into trouble, and the 
necessity for hiding this; hiding 
incriminating evidence; protective hiding of oneself or one’s property; fear of being seen. 
“(TAT17BM) He was captured because he knew too much about something, possibly murder 
(score once for captured [PRO6], and once for knowing)”; 
“(TAT17BM) He’s breaking out of prison ... he’s looking around to see if anyone sees him 
(score once for escape [PRO6] and once for fear of being seen)”. 
 
Projection 4 (d) Responses indicating a defensive need for self-justification on the part of 
the story-teller (i.e., not in response to a question from the examiner). “(TAT8BM) I say it is 
a gun because it looks like one we had at home”; 
“Although this is just a first reaction, he looks like he is escaping”. 
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PROJECTION 5. Apprehensiveness of Death, Injury, or Assault 
This is an overlapping category with PRO(4) 
 
Projection 5 (a) The difference is that in PRO(5) the death, physical attack or injury 
actually occurs or has occurred, whereas in PRO(4) the emphasis on the need for 
protection against threat. Unexplained or unjustified punishment is scored here, as is 
completed suicide. 
“(CAT10) The doggie got run over”; “It looks like his father has just died”; 
“(CAT5) Once there was a baby, and he had no mommy. His mommy died”; “He fell off and 
broke his leg”; 
“His son died”; 
“He shoots himself”; 
“He looks like he just had a fight before”; “He poisoned all the bloodhounds”; 
“He murdered her”; 
“He gets eaten by the alligators”; “He got slapped around”. 
“His pet dog (cat, horse, etc.) was injured (died)” 
The following are borderline cases but are scored here because injury is suggested as resulting 
from the fall. (Do not score a “fall” by itself.) 
“The man’s going to fall. On his head”; 
“The rope is going to fall.. It ends with his body down on the floor”. 
 
Projection 5 (b) Score here also fear of going to sleep. 
“At night he was afraid to go to sleep”. 
If character is described as dead, and in addition the cause of death (e.g, being stabbed, shot) is 
described, score once for death and again for means of assault. If both the assault (e.g., being 
stabbed, shot) and the presence of the weapon (knife, gun) are described, score PRO 5 for the 
assault and PRO 2 for the weapon. 
 
Do not score justified punishment by authority or parents. Score under Identification(3). Do not 
score if hero aggresses against someone else for justified self protection or for vindication. 
Do not score on CAT 3 if the conflict is between the lion and the mouse. 
Do not score “death” on TAT 15; do score if a particular person has died – e.g., son, father. 
Do not score on TAT 8BM, or 13MF if the assaulted character was shot or otherwise hurt by any 
character in the picture; also, do not score if the attack against a non-present character is in 
retaliation for some previous physical attack by that character. 
Do not score illness, injury or death of the prone figure on TAT 12M unless the standing 
character is about to or has physically attacked the prone character. This limitation does not 
apply to the standing character. 
Do not score “spanking’ on CAT 10. 
Do not score “suicide” on TAT 13MF. 
Do score TAT 8BM if prone character shot himself. 
Do score TAT 8BM if patient dies, or if characters are trying to murder, or are “experimenting” 




PROJECTION 6. Themes of Pursuit, Entrapment, and Escape 
 
Projection 6 (a) Included here are themes involving one character pursuing another; also 
score any mention of one character trapping another, kidnap or unjustified being put in 
jail or prison which actually occurs. 
“(CAT10) The dogs are going to chase the kitty; and the kitty is chasing the mousey’; 
“(CAT5) The little bears are going to be tooken”; 
“He’s escaping; he’s running, the police are chasing him”(score twice) “He gets trapped in the 
cave and can’t get out”; 
“TAT3GF) Being held for ransom” 
 
Projection 6 (b) Also included are themes of escape. The escape must be from a physical 
imprisonment or physical danger, or threat thereof (i.e., not symbolic). “Running away” 
when there is no pursuer is scored only if it is due to anticipation of pain or punishment, 
where the anticipation is not justified by the story. 
“(TAT17BM) He escaped from the tower and left the country”; “(TAT17BM) There was a fire 
and he’s escaping out the window (score twice, once for escape and once for fire [PRO2]”; 
Note: The category may be scored twice: once for pursuit-entrapment, once for escape. Note: If 
“being put in jail” is accompanied by a sense of righteousness or moral justification i.e., if the 
story-teller is identifying with the authority who puts the character in jail, or if jail is the justified 
outcome of criminal activity, score under Identification(7). 
“Being put in jail”, “convicted of a crime” is scored under PRO only when the character has not 
committed a crime, but is put there because of the jealousy, fear, or whim of someone else—i.e., 
only when the incarceration is not (legally) justified. Political and war imprisonment 
are scored under PRO(6). 
 
Note: If the character is already in jail or prison at the beginning of the story, score under PRO 
only if it is made clear that this is not due to criminal activity. If it is due to criminal activity, 
score under Identification(7). 
If it is not clear why he is in prison, do not score. 
Note. Score being chased, trapped or caught by police under Identification(7). Do not score 
trapping unless one character traps another (e.g., do not score being trapped in a well, unless one 
character put another there). 
 
Do not score escape if character is being rescued (by hero), where the emphasis is on the rescue 
rather than on the escape. 
Do not score escape if it is only mentioned at the end of the story, or after the examiner’s 
inquiry, unless the need for escape has been implied throughout. 
Do not score escape, when the hero is escaping from “society” or “the world” around him [score 
this under Identification(3)] 
Do not score running away from home; this may qualify for scoring under Identification(3). 
Do not score on CAT3 if the conflict is between the lion and the mouse. If the mouse is injured, 
score under PRO(5). 
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PROJECTION 7. Bizarre or Very Unusual Story or Theme 
This category depends heavily on the subjective judgment of the scorer, who must determine the 
limits of bizarreness. 
 
Projection 7 (a) Negative themes that occur very rarely, especially if they have a peculiar 
twist. 
“(TAT8BM) He goes outside and get glass in his heel and the doctor pulls and puts pins in...’; 
“(CAT3) He’s going to eat the whole house because no one’s there”; “(TAT1) This is a saw ...he 
sawed his desk in half”. 
 
Projection 7 (b) Also included here are instances of unusual punishment, including unusual 
self-punishment. 
“(TAT8BM) He’s thinking what’s going to happen to him when he’s really old, and like he’s 
done something bad, and he’s going to get zapped (chuckle)”; 
“(CAT3) He ate a big piece of wood and got all bloated and blew up (This would also be scored 
under PRO7a)”; 
“(TAT17BM) He is tortured”. 
Do not score as unusual punishment spanking alone, unless it continues for a very long time. 
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IDENTIFICATION: SUMMARY OF SCORING CATEGORIES 
1. Emulation of Skills 
2. Emulation of Characteristics 
3. Regulation of Motives or Behavior 
4. Self-esteem through Affiliation 
5. Work: Delay of Gratification 
6. Role Differentiation 
7. Moralism 
 
IDENTIFICATION 1. Emulation of Skills 
 
Identification 1 (a) References to one character imitating, taking over, or otherwise 
acquiring a skill or talent of another character, or trying or wishing to do so. 
This is often seen in a younger character emulating an older one. 
“(TAT1) He picked up the violin and thought, ‘Maybe if I could be as great as my father’”; 
“(TAT1) The little boy is wondering what this is, if he’ll ever find out; he wants to ask his father 
... waiting until his father comes home..then he finds out.” (This is a borderline case, but is 
scored here because the boy acquires his father’s knowledge.) 
“(TAT1) He wants to do it because he saw other people do it”; 
“(TAT1) He was looking at this violin of his father’s, he really did want to play it....he learned 
how to play it”; 
“(TAT1) He wanted to play ...The man said he would teach him..after a while he got good...”; 
“(TAT1) His father taught him how to do it”; 
“(TAT1 ) He wants a teacher to teach him how”; “(TAT1) He wants to do it like his teacher 
does”; 
 
Do not score “it is his father’s violin and he is playing with it” (in the sense of fooling around 
with the violin). 
Do not score if learning occurs only at the adult’s insistence; the character must want to learn. 
 
IDENTIFICATION 2. Emulation of Characteristics 
 
Identification 2 (a) References to one character imitating, taking over, or otherwise 
acquiring a characteristic, quality or attitude of another character, or trying to do so. 
Examples of “identification with the aggressor” are scored here. 
“(TAT17BM) Jack and the Beanstalk ... he wanted to be a giant”; 
“(TAT17BM) He gave his Tarzan call [gives imitation] and Tarzan came and ...got the bad guy”; 
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Identification 2 (b) References to one character being like another, the same as another, or, 
in an extreme case, merging with another. 
“He hoped he could be like his father” (in a general, non-specific way, “(TAT1) He became 
Wagner”; 
“(TAT17BM) He is trying to be Tarzan”; 
“(TAT17BM) He gets the giant’s muscles and now he’s a giant”; 
Do not score acquisition of another’s physical property (e.g., money, jewels). 
 
IDENTIFICATION 3. Regulation of Motives or Behavior 
Keep in mind here that it is the story-teller who has internalized these regulatory mechanisms 
and is now attributing them to a character in the story. 
 
Identification 3 (a) References to demands, control, influence, guidance, or prohibitions of 
one character over another, or via societal mores; or the active rebelling against these (not 
in thought only, and not by passively doing nothing), including running away from the 
pressures of family or society. Include here being caught doing something one shouldn’t be 
doing. 
“(TAT1) His mother didn’t hear him practicing so he had to start practicing again”; 
“(TAT1) He didn’t want to take violin lessons ...so he threw it away and smashed it [the violin] 
all up”; 
“He is going to ask his mother if he can go out and she is going to say no”; 
“His mother made him take violin lessons, but he didn’t want to so he played hookey” (score 
twice, once for mother controlling him and once for rebellion); 
“He asks his Dad if he can do it some other day”; 
“He was told to play his violin but he doesn’t want to ..but he’ll get in trouble”; 
“He’s a recognized criminal so he won’t have it too easy in the world outside” (borderline); 
“(TAT1) The people who gave it to him said he had to find out what it was 
before he could play it”; 
“(TAT17BM) The world around him is giving him these problems”. “(TAT17BM) Someone 
dared (challenged) him to climb the rope”. “(TAT5) “There is a cat on the piano. She will chase 
it off”. 
Do not score if child does something that parent doesn’t like. 
Do not score if one character tries to influence another but is unsuccessful. 
Do not score boss firing worker, crook blackmailing, or threatening to blackmail someone else.
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Identification 3 (b) Indication of self-criticism, or self-reflection either on the part of the 
story-teller or of a character in the story. 
“It isn’t a very good story”; 
“The mouse built a trap, but he thought it wasn’t very good”; “He feels guilty for what he did”; 
Feeling ashamed, embarrassed, self-conscious 
“(TAT1) He’s not very good... he’s flunking it...he’s really mad because he wanted to be a really 
good one”; 
“(TAT17BM) He’s feeling he should have concentrated more”; “(TAT1) He started to play it, 
but it sounded funny, it didn’t work. “He’s feeling that he is stupid”; 
“He decided ‘I’m not a very good violin player’”; 
“(TAT17BM) He climbed up a vine...gets in trouble...and thinks ‘I shouldn’t have climbed up 
this time. Next time, maybe, not this time”; 
“(TAT17BM) He looks around in fear, but realizes that he does have the strength to continue”; 
“(TAT4) He confessed something that he’d done that wasn’t quite right” 
 
Identification 3 (c) References to justified punishment by parents, guardians, or older 
family member as a way of controlling or regulating a character’s behavior. 
“His father sent him to his room because he was bad” “His mother gets mad and he gets 
spanked”; 
“He breaks it and his father says ‘you’re never going to get a new thing again...’”; “(TAT1) The 
father is furious ...the boy is having to buy another string to 
replace the old one”; 
 
Note: Score 3(a) only once, even if two different people (e.g., parent and teacher) are applying 
the same kind of control or pressure. 
Note: Control through hypnotism or magic is scored under PRO(3) Note: Unjustified punishment 
is scored under PRO(5) 
 
Do not score escape from physical danger, or if the demands are of an ominous nature, or 
suggest an ominous outcome; instead, score PRO(6) 
Do not score if child “has to practice” but it is not stated why this is – e.g., it is not stated that 
parents, teacher insist he practice. 
Do not score child begging parents for something, or hero requesting help, freedom, or one 
character comforting another. 
Do not score being “sorry” about something, unless it is elaborated. 
Do not score being “fired” unless this is elaborated (e.g., a discussion of who fired him). Do not 
score justified punishment by authority that occurs as the outcome of the story; score under 
Identification(7) Moralistic outcome. 
Do not score ‘being put in jail’ here; if being in jail is justified, score under Identification(7); 
otherwise, it may be scored under PRO(6) 
Do not score ‘spanking’ on CAT 10. 
Do not score TAT 4 if the female is trying to prevent the man from leaving, or doing something. 
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IDENTIFICATION 4 - Self-Esteem through Affiliation 
 
Identification 4 (a) Success or satisfaction which comes about through association with 
someone else (not parents, aunts, uncles, grandparents, police), or the expressed need for 
this kind of affiliation. 
“He was happy that he had a friend”; 
“He gave his Tarzan call and Tarzan came and got the bad guy (age 6)” 
“He realizes that he and his classmate are in exactly the same situation ....they become very close 
and comfort themselves with the situation” 
“He must escape and help save his people. The people are very happy they were very poor and 
now they are rich (age 5)”; 
“He’s lonely and needs to be with a family”; 
“He was caught because a trusted friend turned him in” (implied here is the need for a good 
friend)” 
“Has he the courage to master it? Interest must be backed” “He is adopted and lives with a nice 
family” 
“His brother was killed ...he was the only source of pleasure”; 
Note: Adoption by a foster family, if pleasant, is scored here. 
 
Identification 4 (b) Being part of a special group from which some special pleasure or help 
derives. 
“(TAT17BM) He is part of the English navy ... he escapes the French ...he is picked up by an 
English ship”; 
“(TAT17BM) The slave is going down a rope to a fake well. It’s part of the underground railroad 
to help him escape to Canada”; 
“(TAT17BM) The sailor and his crew win the battle in a great defeat”; 
“(TAT17BM) The people are citizens of the U.S...they have all had hard lives. Now they are 
almost at the end of their climb to greatness”; 
“(TAT17BM) This man has every desire to be free. He lives in a community of similar people”.  
 
Note: On the Trapeze picture, score if a point is made of how trusting the two characters are; do 
not score if it is stated that they need to trust each other, or they must trust each other. 
 
Do not score: “friends” giving help, “friends” rescuing, or the need for rescue. Do not score: 
Giving help or comfort on TAT10. 
Do not score comforting, consoling or feeling better from having been comforted on TAT3, 
TAT4 or TAT10, unless this is amplified, e.g., 
“It’s their care for each other that will get them through” 
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IDENTIFICATION 5. Work; Delay of Gratification 
 
Identification 5 (a) References to a character working, or the implication that a character is 
about to work or has been working, where this is not clearly suggested by the picture. 
Working at homework, or references to extensive practicing, or studying very hard, are scored 
here. 
“(TAT1) I have to keep on practicing and I have to do my homework from school. This is just 
fouling up my time” (score once for practicing, once for homework); 
“(TAT1) He has a whole bunch of homework to do, and to practice on the violin” (score twice); 
“He has to study really hard”; 
“He practiced all his life”; “He is working”; 
“(TAT17BM) His muscles are straining and hurting, but he must go on”; 
Score for animal practicing, working, if the story teller seems to identify with the animal. This is 
most likely to occur in children’s stories. 
 
Identification 5 (b) References to delay (e.g., waiting, biding one’s time, planning ahead) in 
order to attain some future gratification. 
A recognition that success will not be immediate. 
“He wants to learn it, but not too fast, not in one day”; 
“He’s looking at a violin ... later, about four months later he can play one chord on it ...then 12 
months later he can play 19 chords, no, he can play beginners ..two years later he can play it very 
well”; 
“(TAT1) He’s looking at it...after a few years he was able to play one”; 
“(TAT17BM) First he was planning his rhythm [his moves] or what he’s going to do when he 
gets up there ...”; 
“(TAT1) It’s a car track and he’s been trying to make this for about two weeks”; 
“(TAT1) He didn’t know how to play it ... he waited and waited for someone to come and help 
him ... his next door neighbor [finally] came and taught him”; 
The following two examples of ‘waiting’ are borderline cases. 
“He is thinking maybe he can play it. And he cares to do it when he grows up”; “He is going to 
try to become a violinist in the next years to come”. 
 
Do not score references to exercising (unqualified) or to being tired from athletic endeavors, or 
working (unqualified) on TAT2. 
Do not score references to a character thinking about the fact that he should do some work, but 
he doesn’t do it. 
Do not score “in the future he did it” unless the need for delay and/or work is clearly mentioned. 




IDENTIFICATION 6. Role Differentiation 
 
Identification 6 (a) Mention of characters in specific adult roles, other than mother or father 
or other relatives (e.g., husband, wife, teacher, sailor, married couple, farmer, priest, soldier, 
scientist, rock-and-roll player, fiancé, ‘professional’, king, princess, manual laborer, gymnast 
(but not ‘trapeze-man’). 
Also included here are specific historical characters. 
 
Note: Capitalization may help differentiate, e.g, mountain climber (someone climbing 
mountains) from Mountain Climber (a profession). 
 
Do not score “girlfriend”, “boyfriend”. 
Do not score mention of mythical or comic book roles here (e.g., giant, Tarzan). 
Do not score a role indicated only by the addition of ___man or ___woman to a noun or 
adjective (e.g., trapezeman, violinman, strongman) unless this is the commonly accepted term to 
designate that role (e.g., mailman, businessman, fireman). 
Do not score references to ominous roles (e.g., hypnotist); these should be scored under PRO(2) 
Do not score “doctor” or “surgeon” on TAT 8BM. 
Do not score violinist, musician, music teacher, etc., on TAT 1. Do not score “farmer” on TAT2. 
Do not score “acrobats” or “trapeze artists” on Trapeze picture. 
Do not score references to law enforcement officers in action here; score under Identification(7). 
Do not score “king” on CAT 1. 
Do not score “guards”, “keepers”, “soldiers”, “police” on TAT17BM. 
Do not score “husband”, “wife”, “married couple”, “bride” or “prostitute” on TAT 2, TAT4, 
TAT13MF, or Trapeze picture. 
Do not score apostrophized terms – e.g., soldier’s cemetery (TAT15). The term must refer to a 





IDENTIFICATION 7. Moralism 
 
Identification 7 (a) Stories that include a moralistic outcome, in which good conquers evil, 
wrongdoing is punished (by other than parents), goodness begets goodness, justice triumphs, a 
(moral) lesson is learned, etc. 
“(TAT17BM) Prisoner breaks out ... starts to run ... Then he thought sooner or later the police 
will find him. So he decided it would just be better to go back, so he went back”; 
“He escaped from the army ... he was a prisoner [of war] ... they chased him ... He lived to tell 
everybody”; 
“He’s been in prison [but] he’s innocent ... He finally proves that he didn’t do it ... he captures 
whoever did it”; 
“He was in jail for speeding ... he’s escaping, gonna kill himself for escaping”; 
 “Climbed the rope, saw a lion .. he was scared ‘I’ll never do it again’”; “(TAT17BM) He is 
probably going to fall because he is a criminal”; 
“He’s thinking about his homework, wondering what happen if he doesn’t get it done ... he’s just 
sitting there, when he walks home slowly he doesn’t do it. When he gets to school [next day] he 
won’t have it done and then he’ll have twice as much to do.” (This is a borderline case, but is 
scored because the implication is that he is worse off for having not done what he was supposed 
to do.) 
“Confessing” re: a crime or moral transgression 
 
Identification 7 (b) Justified punishment administered by teacher, judge, policeman, or 
other authority figure (excluding parents or guardians). 
Included here are stories in which someone breaks (or has broken) the law, is apprehended, and 
put in jail. Usually, this will occur near the end of the story. If a character is in jail at the 
beginning of the story, score only if it is explained that he is in jail for having committed a crime. 
“(TAT17BM) He robbed a bank ... the police will get him ... he will be in jail”; 
 
Note: If being put in jail, prison, etc., is not justified (e.g., due to jealousy, fear, or whim) score 
under PRO(6). 
Note: Score being chased, trapped or caught by police under Identification(7). 
Note: Unjustified punishment, or extremely cruel or unusual punishment is scored under PRO(6) 
or PRO(7). 
 
Do not score if punishment is given by parents or guardian; instead, score Identification(3). 
Do not score “revenge” if this involves criminal or aggressive acts by the person carrying out the 
revenge. 






APPENDIX B: TAT CARD DESCRIPTIONS 
Low Arousal Group 
1: A young boy is looking at a violin that rests on a table in front of him. His head rests in his 
hands and his eyes are downcast. 
2: Country scene with a young woman holding a book in the foreground. In the background, a 
man is working a field alongside a horse, while a pregnant woman watches. 
7GF: A young girl is seated on a couch, holding a doll/baby in her hands, and looking off into 
the distance. Behind/next to her sits a young woman who appears to have a book in her lap and is 
peering over the young girl’s shoulder. 
13B: A young, barefoot boy is sitting on the doorstep of a log cabin in front of an open, dark 
doorway. 
High Arousal Group 
3BM: A figure sits huddled on the floor by a couch with head, chest and right arm resting on 
cushion. On the floor next to the person is an ambiguous object that could be a gun or set of 
keys. 
4: A woman is grabbing the shoulders of a man who is turning away from her and looking off 
into the distance. 
8BM: A boy in a suit and tie stands in the foreground staring straight ahead. Next to him in the 
foreground is an indistinct object which could be a rifle. In the background is a hazy image of a 
shirtless man laying prone with two men standing above and leaning over him, one of whom 
appears to be cutting his abdomen with a scalpel.   
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